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The Americanism of Justice Holmes 
ANDRES YODER

 
There is no obvious way to reconcile each of Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr.’s intellectual sides.  There is the monstrous Holmes, who 
thought the world was meaningless, insignificant, and hopelessly violent.  
There is the tender Holmes, who jealously guarded the time he could spend 
enjoying literature, philosophy, and art.  And there is the scholarly Holmes, 
who left behind a litany of influential judicial opinions and articles, as well 
as a classic book, The Common Law. 
Although the gulfs between each of Holmes’s sides can make 
reconstructing his thought seem daunting, the task is amenable to a fairly 
simple solution: Holmes leavened his dismal worldview with a sense of self 
that allowed him to think of life as valuable, and with a theory of 
cooperative combinations that opened the door to a better future.  Using 
his famous dissent in Lochner v. New York as a case study, it becomes 
possible to see how Holmes built his constitutional jurisprudence from 
these basic premises. 
Perhaps surprisingly, a close investigation of Holmes’s Lochner 
dissent reveals that his worldview, his theory of combinations, and his 
sense of self led him to reject the doctrine of judicial supremacy. 
 
 
 Counsel for a federal agency that administers labor laws.  Thomas Grey, Allen 
Mendenhall, Robert Kulick, Matthew Marro, Michael Rybak, and Murray Scheel provided 
helpful comments. 
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“I believe in the iniquitous doctrine of my country right or wrong.  
Don’t throw me over for my speculative wickedness.” 
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
in a letter to Alice Stopford Green
1
 
INTRODUCTION 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. is an enigma.  Even though his 
outsized influence on American law is beyond dispute,
2
 his worldview and 
self-understanding seem to come from anywhere but here.  Toward the end 
of his decades-long career on the bench, for example, he privately admitted 
to British political theorist Harold Laski, “I see no right in my neighbor to 
share my bread. . . . except so far as he in combination has power to take 
it.”3  The reason?  He had rejected “all postulates of human rights”4 in 
 
 1. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Nov. 9, 1913), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER 
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 22, 22 (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) 
[hereinafter THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES]. 
 2. See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 
424 tbl.6 (2000) (identifying Holmes as the third-most cited American legal scholar of all 
time). 
 3. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (July 23, 1925), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 140, 141. 
 4. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Oct. 23, 1926), in 2 HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–1935, 
at 887, 888 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS VOL. 2]. 
2
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favor of power, coercive or otherwise.
5
  “Good and bad are of real 
significance only for the future where our effort is one of the 
instrumentalities that bring the inevitable to pass,”6 Holmes explained with 
a shrug just before joining the Supreme Court.
7
  “If there is a world it 
seems to me that one may surmise that our judgments of significance and 
worth have no meaning for it.”8 
Coming from a place where moral feelings and value judgments were 
of little consequence, Holmes was content with more flitting breakthroughs 
into “illusory [experiences of] personal spontaneity or independence . . . .”9  
He saw that illusion in “less marked forms as consideration for the weak, 
charity to the poor, drunkenness, going to the play, painting pictures, etc.”10  
But the “ideal expression” of that illusion, he once unsettlingly told his old 
friend Ellen Curtis, was suicide.
11
  If a priest sitting in a confessional had 
overheard Holmes, he would hardly expect to be listening in on a towering 
Supreme Court Justice.  A lonely eccentric, maybe, or perhaps even a 
madman.  But how could a distinguished judge think that way?  How did 
Holmes keep his worldview and his self-understanding from poisoning his 
pen? 
Given Holmes’s unexpected prominence as a legal thinker, it is only 
fitting that his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New York
12
 is as enigmatic 
as the man himself.  Holmes’s dissent has become, without a doubt, holy 
writ in American courts.
13
  One hundred twelve years on, judges continue 
 
 5. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1, 1920), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 102, 102–03 (“I believe that force, mitigated so far as 
may be by good manners, is the ultima ratio . . . .”). 
 6. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Oct. 1, 1901), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 111, 111. 
 7. Holmes was nominated to the Supreme Court on August 11, 1902 and confirmed on 
December 4, 1902.  See LIVA BAKER, THE JUSTICE FROM BEACON HILL: THE LIFE AND TIMES 
OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 339–56 (1991).  His tenure on the Court spanned thirty years.  
See id. at 337–635. 
 8. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice S. Green (Oct. 1, 1901), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 111, 111. 
 9. Sheldon M. Novick, Justice Holmes’s Philosophy, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 703, 734 
(1992) (quoting Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Ellen Curtis (Jan. 7, 1901), in Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr., Papers (on file with the Harvard Law School Library), 
http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/item/36699695/8 
[https://perma.cc/DQA3-Q73K]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 13. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day it Was Decided”: Lochner and 
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 692 (2005) (saying Holmes’s Lochner 
dissent “became the canonical rejection of the anti-canonical decision in Lochner”). 
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to rely on its prestige in even the biggest cases,
14
 and many of the         
best-known scholars continue to sing its praises.
15
  So it comes as a surprise 
when you thumb through the opinion and find that Holmes’s great dissent 
is, according to law professor Cass Sunstein, positively soulless.  In his 
influential 1987 article Lochner’s Legacy,16 Sunstein describes Holmes’s 
dissent as “com[ing] close to modern interest-group pluralism, which treats 
the political process as an unprincipled struggle among self-interested 
groups for scarce social resources”17—a description I will argue hits the 
nail on the head.
18
  So aside from the obvious rhetorical merits of Holmes’s 
opinion,
19
 it is not so easy to see how Holmes’s dissent has earned the 
allegiance of generations. 
In this Article, I tackle both the mystery of Holmes’s worldview and 
self-understanding, and the riddle of his Lochner dissent.  My working 
theory is that each question helps answer the other.  Holmes’s Lochner 
opinion provides a concrete example of how he applies his personal views, 
while his personal views give shape to his Lochner opinion.  By setting the 
questions side by side, it becomes possible to get a better handle on each. 
Of course, seeing inside Holmes’s head is tricky.  Despite leaving 
behind mounds of judicial opinions, scholarly writings, speeches, and 
letters to friends and admirers, his writing on the whole trends toward 
partial thoughts, vignettes, and abbreviated commentary on others’ ideas.  
And as the question presented by his Lochner dissent suggests, even 
Holmes’s best legal writing only gets you so far.  In order to get to the 
essence of his thought, you have to consider his personal views.  But that is 
where the difficulty lies.  Whether we look to Holmes’s weighty book The 
Common Law or to any of his carefully crafted articles, he never went to 
the trouble of fully explaining his worldview and sense of self.  No matter 
where you look, a complete accounting of Holmes is just not there.  We 
only have fragments. 
 
 14. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting) (quoting Holmes’s Lochner opinion favorably in a landmark same-sex marriage 
case). 
 15. For example, in 2012, highly regarded judge and legal scholar Richard Posner 
wrote: “Holmes’s one-page [Lochner] dissent says everything that needs to be said to 
unmask any pretense that the majority was engaged in something that might be called legal 
analysis.”  Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
519, 549 (2012). 
 16. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987). 
 17. Id. at 879. 
 18. See infra Section II.C (analyzing the mechanics of Holmes’s Lochner dissent). 
 19. See, e.g., ALLEN MENDENHALL, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., PRAGMATISM, AND 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AGON: AESTHETIC DISSENT AND THE COMMON LAW 54–61 (2017) 
(highlighting Holmes’s use of style and sound in his Lochner dissent). 
4
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To complicate matters, the fragments we do have resist the big 
picture.  Holmes enjoyed making points with sketches rather than with 
step-by-step arguments.
20
  He tended to glide over his ideas as if they were 
familiar or well worn, even when they were not.
21
  And although he took 
pains to maintain a plainspoken air, he often put things in a way that 
suggested a deeper or personal meaning.  To mark his ninetieth birthday, 
for instance, CBS aired a radio broadcast of tributes to the venerable judge, 
as well as his response.
22
  But rather than drawing a lesson from his career, 
Holmes meditated on the poetry of Virgil.
23
  “Death plucks my ears and 
says, Live—I am coming,” warned the Roman bard, to which the old 
Yankee responded, “[T]o live is to function.  That is all there is in living.”24  
As hard as Holmes’s message might hit us, it is difficult to understand what 
exactly he means.  We can surely remember that life is functioning, but 
how do we incorporate that wisdom into anything else? 
In order to uncover Holmes’s fundamental commitments, I take his 
advice on reading well.  In a letter to British jurist Frederick Pollock, 
Holmes explained how he thought the great German philosophers should 
be read: “I believe that the real contribution of the [German]             
system-makers was one that was shared in by outsiders—viz., a certain 
number of aperçus or insights.  The systems disappear, the insights 
remain . . . .”25  So we see that in Holmes’s mind, even some of the most 
technical and complex prose out there was best understood by zeroing in on 
a few essential insights.  When you apply Holmes’s interpretive technique 
 
 20. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to John C. H. Wu (Aug. 26, 1926), in 
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND 
PAPERS 186, 187 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936) [hereinafter BOOK NOTICES AND 
UNCOLLECTED LETTERS] (“When the Germans in the late war disregarded what we called 
the rules of the game, I don’t see there was anything to be said except: we don’t like it and 
shall kill you if we can.”). 
 21. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 26, 1922), in 2 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR 
FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874–1932, at 89, 90 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942) (“I always say 
that society is founded on the death of men—if you don’t kill the weakest one way you kill 
them another—and the romance of life is largely found on the same fact . . . .”). 
 22. See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE INNER 
SELF 462–66 (1993). 
 23. See id. at 463–64. 
 24. OLIVER W. HOLMES, Justice Holmes’ First and Only Radio Address, in BOOK 
NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 142, 142.  See also Oliver W. 
Holmes, Radio Address (1931), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 20, 21 (reciting 
Holmes’s portion of the radio address). 
 25. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 1, 1918), in 1      
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND SIR 
FREDERICK POLLOCK, 1874–1932, at 260, 261 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). 
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to his own catalog, you end up paying less attention to the particulars of 
what he is saying, and more attention to how it makes sense for him to say 
it.  He becomes a rolling kaleidoscope of moods and observations—laid 
over only a handful of repeating patterns. 
In this Article, I outline those patterns in three parts.  In Part I, I focus 
on Holmes’s worldview and self-understanding.  I outline the major 
features of Holmes’s worldview, including his theory of cooperative 
combinations, and I explain how his worldview gave shape and form to his 
sense of self.  Although I believe that Holmes’s worldview was explicitly 
devoid of meaning, I maintain that his sense of self allowed him to see 
individual life as meaningful, and that his theory of combinations suggested 
that social life tends to improve over time. 
In Part II, I look at the mechanics of Holmes’s Lochner dissent.  I set 
the stage by recounting the rise of a legal doctrine called the right to liberty 
of contract.  Then I identify what Holmes’s dissent responded to by 
explaining how Justices Rufus Peckham and John Marshall Harlan 
respectively applied that right in Lochner.  I then turn my attention to 
Holmes’s dissent.  I explain how Holmes’s worldview informed his 
rejection of the right to contract and led him to dismiss the doctrine of 
judicial supremacy. 
Finally, in Part III, I investigate how Holmes applied his                
self-understanding to his Lochner dissent.  I argue that while Holmes’s 
worldview is sufficient to explain the approach he took to Lochner, he 
augmented his reasons for taking that approach with the personal meaning 
he took from his sense of self.  Holmes, it turns out, was not willing to 
leave a romantic view of life out of his jurisprudence.  On the contrary, his 
jurisprudence combined a gloomy worldview with an inspiring faith in the 
American spirit. 
In the end, I argue that Holmes’s Lochner dissent has a distinctly 
sentimental side.  It reflects Holmes’s sad and sweet sense of Americanism.  
It salutes a hope that many Americans had locked away in their hearts.  
And it shows us who Holmes really was.  But before I can draw the man 
out of the Lochner case, I must start at the beginning: Holmes’s worldview 
and self-understanding. 
I. HOLMES’S WORLDVIEW AND SELF-UNDERSTANDING 
In order to explain Holmes’s basic outlook on life, I first have to 
borrow a couple of terms from biology.  When biologists ask why an 
organism has certain features or traits, they take an ultimate perspective on 
it, and when they ask how an organism does something, they take a 
6
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proximate perspective.
26
  Biologist Edward Wilson recently illustrated the 
distinction with an example.
27
  To understand why we have hands rather 
than hooves or flippers, he explained, we must consider our evolutionary 
history.
28
  But to understand how we actually use our hands, we have to 
consider their anatomy and utility.
29
  So in rough terms, Wilson tells us that 
the ultimate perspective seeks out objective explanations covering 
evolutionary time, while the proximate perspective looks at how particular 
organisms function in real time.
30
 
In a 1900 address to the Tavern Club, Holmes announced that his 
ultimate take on reality was positivistic: “Today the whole domain of truth 
concerning the visible world,” he told the Club, “belongs to science.”31  
Nineteen years later, in a letter to legal scholar Morris Cohen, he explained 
that he had adopted his worldview when he was young.  Describing his 
general mindset as a “scientific way of looking at the world,”32 Holmes 
gave Cohen his accounting of how he came to adopt it early in life.  He 
initially based it, he recalled, on what he knew of the ambitions of Charles 
Darwin and the British philosopher Herbert Spencer, and what he thought 
their ideas implied about human nature and humanity’s place in the 
universe: 
 
 26. See, e.g., ERNST MAYR, THIS IS BIOLOGY: THE SCIENCE OF THE LIVING WORLD 67 
(1997).  German-American biologist Ernst Mayr notes that in 1938, British biologist “John 
Baker was apparently the first author to distinguish clearly between ultimate . . . and 
proximate ” biological explanations.  ERNST MAYR, THE GROWTH OF BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: 
DIVERSITY, EVOLUTION, AND INHERITANCE 68 (1982). 
 27. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE MEANING OF HUMAN EXISTENCE 15 (2014). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id.  In his 1899 speech entitled Law in Science and Science in Law, Holmes laid 
out a general description of ultimate and proximate perspectives.  Holmes explained that if 
you take your perception of a particular statue or symphony, from the ultimate view the only 
relevant observations you could make about them would be facts about their characteristics.  
But from the proximate view, when you consider how your mind actually processes the 
statue or symphony, it becomes relevant to observe how they make you feel.  Holmes called 
observations of ultimate reality quantitative determinations and observations of proximate 
reality qualitative judgments.  Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 
12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 456 (1899).  Justice Holmes’s speech is also reprinted in OLIVER W. 
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210 (1920) [hereinafter COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS], as 
well as in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 185. 
 31. Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, given at a Tavern Club 
Dinner (Mar. 4, 1900), in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
119, 120 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1962) [hereinafter OCCASIONAL SPEECHES].  This 
speech is also available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 48. 
 32. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Morris Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 110, 110. 
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My father was brought up scientifically . . . and I was not.  Yet there was 
with him . . . a certain softness of attitude toward the interstitial     
miracle—the phenomenon without phenomenal antecedents, that I did not 
feel.  The difference [from the attitude of earlier times] was in the air, 
although perhaps only the few of my time felt it.  The Origin of Species I 
think came out while I was in college.  H. Spencer had announced his 
intention to put the universe into our pockets—I hadn’t read either of them 
to be sure, but as I say it was in the air.  I did read [British historian Henry 
Thomas] Buckle . . . [Ralph Waldo] Emerson and [British writer John] 
Ruskin . . . .  Probably a sceptical temperament that I got from my mother 
had something to do with my way of thinking. . . .  But I think science was 
at the bottom.
33
 
Without much scientific training,
34
 the statements Holmes left behind 
about his ultimate perspective are brief and vague.  Luckily, he said enough 
to give us a sense of what he thought the world was like.  In talking about 
his ultimate perspective, Holmes thought all living organisms (including 
people) were purely physical and subject to the same natural laws as 
everything else in nature.
35
  He liked to refer to organisms’ interactions as 
the struggle for life—which describes the idea that the instinct to survive 
creates conflicts between organisms that are often painful and deadly.
36
  In 
Holmes’s cosmos, humans were like any other animal: one way or another, 
they were constantly fighting for their share of the pie.  However, rather 
 
 33. Id.  Although Holmes did not read Darwin or Spencer when he was in college, he 
read Darwin in his 60s, and Spencer soon after college.  See MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, 
JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: THE SHAPING YEARS 1841–1870, at 156 (1957). 
 34. Despite telling Cohen that he had not had a particularly science-based education, 
soon after college Holmes was exposed to the philosophy of science from his friend and 
mentor Chauncey Wright.  See LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF 
IDEAS IN AMERICA 201–32 (2001).  Wright seemed to have a lasting impact on Holmes.  In 
1929, at the age of 88, Holmes held onto the opinion that Wright had “real merit.”  Letter 
from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, 
supra note 1, at 108, 108. 
 35. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in 
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108, 108 (“I see no reason for attributing to man a 
significance different in kind from that which belongs to a baboon or to a grain of sand.”); 
Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Jan. 11, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, 
supra note 1, at 107, 107–08 (“I regard [man] as I do other species (except that my private 
interests are with his) having for his main business to live and propagate, and for his main 
interest food and sex.”). 
 36. See, e.g., The Gas Stokers’ Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 558, 583 (1873) [hereinafter The 
Gas Stokers’ Strike] (“The struggle for life, undoubtedly, is constantly putting the interests 
of men at variance with those of the lower animals.  And the struggle does not stop in the 
ascending scale with the monkeys, but is equally the law of human existence.”).  Holmes’s 
analysis of the Gas Stoker’s Strike is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, 
at 120. 
8
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than being good or evil, the struggle for life is simply a fact about the 
world.  “The withering of a leaf, the sickness of man, the struggle for life,” 
Holmes told Laski in 1926, “all are normal sequences of the datum—as are 
frauds and murders.”37  “The world has produced the rattlesnake as well as 
me,” he told diplomat Lewis Einstein a dozen years earlier, “but I kill it if I 
get a chance, as also mosquitos, cockroaches, murderers, and flies.  My 
only judgment is that they are incongruous with the world I want . . . .”38 
Holmes’s belief in a purely physical world did not stop at observable 
phenomena.  He applied it all the way down to human consciousness.  “I 
believe,” he told Taiwanese jurist John Wu in a 1926 letter, 
that our personality is a cosmic ganglion, that just as when certain rays 
meet and cross there is white light at the meeting point, but the rays go on 
after the meeting as they did before, so, when certain other streams of 
energy cross, the meeting point can frame a syllogism or wag its tail.
39
 
“I [don’t] see why anyone should bother,” he told Cohen a few years 
earlier, 
over the suggestion that consciousness is an epiphenomenon—It is the way 
the cosmos acts when it gets a certain knot in its guts—and I don’t perceive 
why there is any more right to think away consciousness than there is to 
think away nerve tissue—the total is the datum.
40
 
But as cognitive scientist Steven Pinker observed in his 2002 book The 
Blank Slate, if consciousness has a purely physical basis, we are left with a 
staggering problem.
41
  Accepting that configurations of matter explain the 
life of our minds—everything we experience and think and feel, including 
our most sacred, profound, and strongly felt beliefs—what are we to make 
of humanity’s meaning?42 
Although Holmes plainly perceived this problem—“I doubt if a 
shudder would go through the spheres if the whole ant heap were 
kerosened,” he told Lewis Einstein in 190943—he never attempted to solve 
 
 37. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Aug. 20, 1926), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 76, 77. 
 38. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (May 21, 1914), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 114, 114. 
 39. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to John C. H. Wu (May 5, 1926), in BOOK NOTICES 
AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 184, 185. 
 40. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Morris Cohen (July 21, 1920), in Felix S. Cohen, 
The Holmes-Cohen Correspondence, 9 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 19 (1948). 
 41. See STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 
191–92 (2002). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Aug. 19, 1909), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at xxv, xxvi. 
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it.  Instead, he moved beyond it.  “I am not running the universe,” he wrote 
in a 1912 letter to the Irish writer Canon Patrick Augustine Sheehan, “and 
am not called on to lie awake with cosmic worries.”44  In a 1902 address at 
Northwestern University, Holmes evoked the ultimate perspective and 
expressed his feeling that it is incomplete: “[I]t might seem that the law of 
life is . . . that man should produce food and raiment in order that he might 
produce yet other food and other raiment to the end of time.  Yet who does 
not rebel at that conclusion?”45  Holmes’s solution was to supplement his 
ultimate perspective with the proximate perspective (the existential 
perspective of a mind functioning in real time).  From that vantage point, 
the only things that matter are specific pursuits.
46
 
A few major themes run through Holmes’s discussion of the 
proximate perspective, including two outward signs that a person is 
operating from a proximate point of view.  The first sign Holmes talked 
about was the pursuit of something that is functionally useless.
47
  Holmes 
 
 44. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Oct. 18, 1912), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 7, 8; see also Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis 
Einstein’s Daughter (May 6, 1925), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 75, 75 (“I 
think it futile to ask what does it all amount to. . . .  [T]here is no answer except that it is not 
our business to enquire.”). 
 45. Oliver W. Holmes, Address of Chief Justice Holmes at the dedication of the 
Northwestern University Law School Building (Oct. 20, 1902), in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS, supra note 30, at 272, 272.  This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 98. 
 46. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Apr. 1, 1911), in 
HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE: THE LETTERS OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 
AND CANON PATRICK AUGUSTINE SHEEHAN 40, 41 (David H. Burton ed., 1976) [hereinafter 
HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE] (“I look at man as a cosmic 
[insignificance], . . . except from a human and social point of view, working to some 
unknown end or no end, outside himself and having sufficient reasons, easily stated, for 
doing his best.”).  Holmes’s use of the proximate perspective is among the least understood 
aspects of his thought.  Law professor Brian Leiter has dismissed it as “silly mysticism and 
romantic wistfulness.”  Brian Leiter, Holmes, Nietzsche, and Classical Realism, 37 (Univ. of 
Tex. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 003, 2000), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=215193 [https://perma.cc/Y34B-
R3ZK].  Law professor Albert Alschuler has criticized it as a type of nihilism that attempts 
to find meaning through blind commitment.  See ALBERT W. ALSCHULER, LAW WITHOUT 
VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK, AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES 20–23 (2000).  But I think 
Leiter and Alschuler are both wrong.  As explained below, Holmes’s proximate perspective 
is both consistent with positivism and capable of adequately addressing the question of life’s 
meaning.  Infra text accompanying notes 47–63. 
 47. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Rudolph C. Lehmann, given at a 
Tavern Club Dinner (Nov. 24, 1896), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 90, 91 
(“[U]selessness is the highest kind of use.  It is kindling and feeding the ideal spark without 
which life is not worth living.”).  In his 1902 speech Address of Chief Justice Holmes, 
Holmes distinguished between humanity’s ultimate concerns and useless proximate pursuits, 
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keyed in on uselessness because when a person pursues a goal that has no 
practical benefit, it suggests the person pursues it as an end in itself.  The 
pursuit is the reward.
48
  Holmes vividly illustrated this sign in his 1896 
speech, Rudolph C. Lehmann: 
[One summer] I went down to see a man go through the [Niagara Falls] 
rapids on a boat of his construction.  I got there a little late and the man was 
drowned before I arrived.  Afterwards a lady talking of the accident said 
that if the attempt had promised any possible good to his fellow men the 
case would have been different, but that under the circumstances she could 
not see any justification for a pure waste of life.  I replied, Madam, on the 
contrary precisely because it was not useful it was a perfect expression of 
this male contribution to our common stock of morality. . . .  [Without this 
uselessness] life is not worth living.
49
 
Holmes’s second outward sign that a person is operating from the 
proximate perspective is the pursuit of something that is unattainable.
50
  
Like useless goals, unattainable goals do not pay, so when a person pursues 
them their motivation must be the experience of the chase.  In explaining 
this idea to Laski, Holmes identified absolute truth and moral perfection as 
examples of such goals.
51
  And like the pursuit of useless things, Holmes 
 
and called that distinction the “double view of life.”  Address of Chief Justice Holmes at the 
dedication of the Northwestern University Law School Building (Oct. 20, 1902), in 
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 272, 272–75. 
 48. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (May 24, 1919), in 1     
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. 
LASKI, 1916–1935, at 207, 208 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) [hereinafter HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS VOL. 1] (“I desire a world in which art and philosophy, in their useless aspect, may 
have a place.  I say useless, to mark the point that they are ends in themselves.”); Oliver W. 
Holmes, Address of Chief Justice Holmes, at the dedication of the Northwestern University 
Law School Building (Oct. 20, 1902), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 272, 
272–73 (“Art, philosophy, charity, the search for the north pole, the delirium of every great 
moment in man’s experience—all . . . mean waste . . . .  The justification of art is not that it 
offers prizes to those who succeed in the economic struggle . . . .  The justification is in art 
itself . . . .”). 
 49. Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Rudolph C. Lehmann, given at a Tavern 
Club Dinner (Nov. 24, 1896), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 90, 90–91. 
 50. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of 
Harvard University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 76 
(“[W]ho of us could endure a world . . . without the senseless passion for knowledge       
out–reaching the flaming bounds of the possible, without ideals the essence of which is that 
they never can be achieved?”).  This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, 
supra note 1, at 87. 
 51. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Apr. 6, 1920), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 115, 115 (“[Truth] postulates itself as a thing to be 
attained, but like other good ideals it is unattainable and therefore may be called absurd.  
Some ideals, like morality, a system of specific conduct for every situation, would be 
11
Yoder: The Americanism of Justice Holmes
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
364 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:2 
thought the pursuit of unattainable things made life meaningful.  As he told 
the Federal Bar Association in 1932: “Life seems to me like a Japanese 
picture which our imagination does not allow to end with the margin.  We 
aim at the infinite and when our arrow falls to earth it is in flames.”52 
As heady as useless and unattainable pursuits can be, it turns out that 
Holmes’s understanding of the proximate perspective encompasses much 
more.  In going about their daily lives, people normally take a proximate 
view.  When they do, they pursue things that are both useful and 
attainable.
53
  Speaking from his own experience as a judge, Holmes said 
that when he considered a case, it did not trigger any abstract moral or 
philosophical feelings like egotism, selflessness, or a sense of duty.
54
  He 
was merely fixated on the problem he was trying to solve, and he did his 
best to solve it.
55
  In an 1897 speech called George Otis Shattuck, Holmes 
listed other examples of everyday efforts that take a proximate focus, 
including navigating the seas, contributing to a war effort, arguing a case in 
court, or running a company.
56
  “If you want to hit a bird on the wing,” 
Holmes told the Suffolk Bar a few years later, “you must have all your will 
in a focus . . . you must be living in your eye on that bird.  Every 
achievement is a bird on the wing.”57 
Holmes thought day-to-day proximate thinking takes up the bulk of 
thinking people do.
58
  After acknowledging that some people seem to live 
 
detestable if attained and therefore . . . must be . . . striven for on the tacit understanding that 
it will not be reached . . .”). 
 52. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to the Federal Bar Association (Feb. 29, 1932), in 
BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 143, 143.  This letter is also 
available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 20. 
 53. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks at a dinner given in Holmes’s honor by the 
Bar Association of Boston (Mar. 7, 1900), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 
244, 247 (“The joy of life is to put out one’s power in some natural and useful or harmless 
way.  There is no other.”).  This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra 
note 1, at 77, 79. 
 54. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Mar. 21, 1908), in 
HOLMES-SHEEHAN CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 46, at 21, 22.   
 55. Id. (“[A] sense of responsibility is a confession of weakness.  If I put all my powers 
into deciding the case . . . I neither feel responsibility nor egotism, nor yet altruism—I am 
just all in the problem and doing my best.”). 
 56. See Oliver W. Holmes, George Otis Shattuck, in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 
31, at 92, 95–96.  This speech is also available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 
97. 
 57. Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks at a dinner given in Holmes’s honor by the Bar 
Association of Boston (Mar. 7, 1900), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 244, 
247.  This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 77. 
 58. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Albert Venn Dicey, given at a 
Tavern Club Dinner (Nov. 4, 1898), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 106, 107 
12
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their lives with a predominant focus on useless or unattainable goals, he 
believed they were anomalies, telling Einstein on one occasion, “[W]hile I 
often feel like a worm when I read of men whose dominant motive is love 
for their kind, I console myself by thinking that most of the great work 
done in the world comes from a different type.”59  In a 1925 letter to Wu, 
Holmes offered his own defense of the idea that most people simply focus 
on performing their daily work.  “I [do not] believe the economic 
opinion . . . intimated [in the New Testament],”60 Holmes remembered 
telling an acquaintance.  “[T]o love my neighbor as myself [does] not seem 
to me the true or at least the necessary foundation for a noble life,” he 
continued.
61
 
I [think] the true view [is] that of my imaginary society of jobbists . . . .  
Their job is their contribution to the general welfare and when a man is on 
that, he will do it better the less he thinks either of himself or of his 
neighbors, and the more he puts all his energy into the problem he has to 
solve.
62
 
“[A] man who thinks he has been an egotist all his life,” he told Laski a few 
years earlier, “will find on the Day of Judgment that he has been a better 
altruist than those who thought more about it.”63 
Although anyone’s attention can glide from the ultimate world to a 
“jobbist” proximate pursuit, exactly what the proximate view can offer is 
still hemmed in by the limitations imposed by nature.  Even if everyone 
had a job, not everyone would benefit equally from any particular person’s 
work.  People are still subject to the laws Darwin set down, and the 
struggle for life will always reward some more than it rewards others.
64
  
 
(“The interest of men is not money or beauty or truth but the pursuit of money or beauty or 
truth.  And all experience the same vital pleasure—the one great pleasure and end of    
life—that of realizing their own spontaneous energy through whatever channel they are able 
to bring it out.”). 
 59. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Jan. 15, 1915), in THE       
HOLMES-EINSTEIN LETTERS: CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND LEWIS EINSTEIN 
1903–1935, at 105, 106 (James Bishop Peabody ed., 1964). 
 60. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to John C. H. Wu (Mar. 26, 1925), in BOOK NOTICES 
AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 178, 178. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Dec. 9, 1921), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 115, 115. 
 64. See The Gas Stokers’ Strike, supra note 36, at 583 (“It has always seemed to us a 
singular anomaly that believers in the theory of evolution and in the natural development of 
institutions by successive adaptations to the environment, should be found laying down a 
theory of government intended to establish its limits once for all by a logical deduction from 
axioms. . . .  This tacit assumption of the solidarity of the interests of society is very 
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But for Holmes, life’s built-in necessity to compete was not only 
destructive, it was also the basis for pools of social stability and increased 
productivity.
65
  In his 1885 address The Law, Holmes briefly surveyed 
human history from 30,000 feet and saw a series of “painful step[s]” and 
“world-shaking contest[s] by which mankind has worked and fought its 
way from savage isolation to organic social life.”66  On Holmes’s 
accounting of the past, the instinct to survive drew people together into 
cooperative combinations so that they could more easily satisfy their needs 
and wants, and so that they would be better able to compete against other 
groups, people, and animals.
67
  Even in a Darwinian world, Holmes 
believed, social life tends to expand the circle of people who benefit from a 
particular person’s efforts.68 
Although Holmes’s theory as to how societies evolve contains a streak 
of optimism, he did not consider it to be starry-eyed.  He thought the theory 
merely described the way things were.  As he explained in his dissent in the 
1896 Massachusetts case Vegelahn v. Guntner: “It is plain from the 
slightest consideration of practical affairs, or the most superficial reading of 
industrial history, that free competition means combination, and that the 
organization of the world, now going on so fast, means an ever-increasing 
might and scope of combination.”69  And Holmes was right.  During his 
adulthood, the United States’ industrial and agricultural production grew 
 
common, but seems to us to be false.”).  This article is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 120. 
 65. See MENDENHALL, supra note 19, at 101 (arguing that Holmes viewed society as 
being “rife with conflict that necessitates eusociality, a behavioral condition in which 
members of a civilization learn to work together to secure healthier, safer lives for 
themselves and their posterity regardless of their divergent principles and fundamental 
disagreements”). 
 66. Oliver W. Holmes, The Law, Remarks at a Suffolk Bar Association Dinner (Feb. 5, 
1885), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 20, 22.  This speech also appears in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 221. 
 67. See Holmes, The Gas Stokers’ Strike, supra note 36, at 583 (“The struggle for life, 
undoubtedly, is constantly putting the interests of men at variance with those of the lower 
animals.  And the struggle does not stop in the ascending scale with the monkeys, but is 
equally the law of human existence.”); OLIVER W. HOLMES, Law and the Social Factor, in 
BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 138, 138 (arguing that in the 
course of history, society has been determined by “the mechanically determined outcome of 
the cooperation and clash of private effort.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks to the Essex Bar (undated), in OCCASIONAL 
SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 48, 49 (“Our country . . . is bound to the other nations more and 
more closely by wire and rail and steamer, by commerce, yes, and by sympathy, as the 
world grows more and more one.”). 
 69. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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fourfold.
70
  At the same time, huge disparities in wealth opened up between 
business elites and everyone else.
71
  According to political scientist Howard 
Gillman, the pull of workers into expanding industries and the uneven 
accumulations of wealth “resulted in intensified battles between wage 
earners seeking a greater share of the wealth being produced and owners 
seeking lower labor costs.”72 
So it is no wonder that one of Holmes’s most developed examples of 
combinations centered on the battles between organized labor and business 
leaders.  As a judge, those battles often found him.  When Holmes 
considered disputes between labor and capital, his starting point was 
always capitalism.  He championed capitalism because he thought it was 
the best way yet devised to harness people’s natural tendencies to look after 
their own interests and to do so in combination with others.
73
  In order to 
stay on top, business leaders have to outperform their rivals by accounting 
for what the public wants, what it is likely to want in the future, and how 
much it is willing to pay.
74
  That means increasing accumulations of capital 
are signs that society is becoming more productive and more responsive to 
popular needs and wants.
75
  Holmes sometimes illustrated this idea with a 
quip about investor Albert Nickerson.  “He made a fortune in the stock 
market—and said one day—‘They talk of our leading the market.  We only 
follow the procession ahead, like little boys.  If we turn down a side street 
the procession doesn’t.’  Which I thought showed size.”76 
 
 70. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF 
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 76 (1993). 
 71. Id. at 77. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (July 16, 1926), in 
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS VOL. 2, supra note 4, at 856, 856 (“[T]he capitalist regime [is] 
better than the proposed substitutes . . . .”). 
 74. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, Economic Elements, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra 
note 30, at 279, 280–81 (“[T]he ability of the ablest men under the present regime is 
directed to getting the largest markets and the largest returns. . . .  [I]f every desirable object 
were in the hands of a monopolist, intent on getting all he could for it . . . they would be 
consumed by those who were able to get them and that would be the ideal result.”)  This 
work also appears in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 128. 
 75. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Franklin Ford (Apr. 6, 1911), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 138, 138 (“[As for] the problem [of] . . . adjusting 
production to the equilibrium of social desires . . . if every desideratum were in the hands of 
a separate monopolist bent on getting all he could for it, you would get an ideal result, if 
each monopolist knew his business, as he would have to keep his place.  I confess that the 
present passion for disorganization seems to me, I won’t say amazing, but certainly 
foolish.”). 
 76. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Apr. 22, 1922), in HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS VOL. 1, supra note 48, at 417, 418.  Holmes used this quip sixteen years earlier in a 
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Holmes was perhaps never more clear about how well he thought 
capitalism captured mankind’s natural tendency to combine with others 
than in his 1913 address to the Harvard Law School Association.  “We are 
apt to contrast the palace with the hovel, the dinner at Sherry’s with the 
working pail,” he began, 
[but] large ownership means investment, and investment means the 
direction of labor towards the production of the greatest returns . . . .  [W]e 
need to think things instead of words—to drop ownership, money, etc., and 
to think of the stream of products; of wheat and cloth and railway travel.  
When we do, it is obvious that the many . . . have substantially all there 
is . . . [and] that the function of private ownership is to divine in advance 
the equilibrium of social desires.”
77
 
Thirteen years earlier, in his dissent in the Massachusetts case Plant v. 
Woods,
78
 Holmes similarly argued that capitalism’s merits emerge when it 
is considered in light of the cold logic of anthropological fact: 
The annual product, subject to an infinitesimal deduction for the luxuries of 
the few, is directed to consumption by the multitude, and is consumed by 
the multitude always. . . .  It is only by devesting [sic] our minds of 
questions of ownership and other machinery of distribution, and by looking 
solely at the question of consumption,—asking ourselves what is the annual 
product, who consumes it, and what changes would or could we      
make,—that we can keep in the world of realities.
79
 
Although Holmes thought capitalists could distribute goods and 
services more efficiently and effectively than anyone else, he was unwilling 
to put roadblocks up in front of other groups who had interests that were 
adverse to theirs.
80
  It was always counterproductive, he thought, to 
interfere with the nonviolent activities of any combination.
81
  In the 1904 
 
letter to Pollock.  See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (May 25, 1906), 
in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 67, 68. 
 77. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law 
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 
30, at 291, 293–94.  This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, 
at 145. 
 78. Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900). 
 79. Id. at 1016 (Holmes, C.J., dissenting). 
 80. See, e.g., id. (“But, subject to the qualifications which I have expressed, I think it 
lawful for a body of workmen to try by combination to get more than they are now getting, 
although they do it at the expense of their fellows, and to that end to strengthen their union 
by the boycott and the strike.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1081 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“The only debatable ground is the nature of the means by which . . . damage [in 
pursuit of a larger market share] may be inflicted.  We all agree that it cannot be done by 
force or threats of force.”). 
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Supreme Court case Northern Securities Co. v. United States,
82
 Holmes 
argued that the ancient law of the struggle for life described social instincts 
better than free market principles did.
83
  In response to Harlan’s plurality 
opinion, in which he maintained that the Constitution’s Commerce Clause84 
empowers Congress to prohibit certain kinds of anticompetitive 
combinations,
85
 Holmes wrote: 
I am happy to know that only a minority of my brethren adopt an 
interpretation of the law which in my opinion would make eternal the 
[Hobbesian war of all against all] and disintegrate society so far as it could 
into individual atoms.  If that were its intent I should regard calling such a 
law a regulation of commerce as a mere pretense.  It would be an attempt to 
reconstruct society.
86
 
Eight years earlier in Vegelahn, Holmes similarly connected the struggle 
for life with combinations and opposed them both to the law of 
competition.
87
  Business owners, he explained, have always been able to 
harm their competitors “in the battle of trade”88 because it is 
“generally . . . accepted that free competition is worth more to society than 
it costs.”89  “I have seen the suggestion made,” he continued, 
that the conflict between employers and employees is not competition.  But 
I venture to assume that none of my brethren would rely on that suggestion.  
If the policy on which our law is founded is too narrowly expressed in the 
term “free competition,” we may substitute “free struggle for life.”  
Certainly, the policy is not limited to struggles between persons of the same 
class, competing for the same end.  It applies to all conflicts of temporal 
interests.
90
 
So under the heading of the struggle for life, Holmes was able to study 
the activity of capitalists and the activity of organized labor using a single 
set of assumptions.  Everyone, he was convinced, combines to get more of 
what they want.  The contests “between the effort of every man to get the 
 
 82. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
 83. See id.  
 84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 85. The law in question was the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., which 
prohibits every contract, combination, monopoly, or attempted monopoly in restraint of 
interstate trade or commerce.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3 (2012).  Harlan only narrowed the sweeping 
language of the Act by interpreting it as enacting “the general law of competition.”  N. Sec. 
Co., 193 U.S. at 338 (Harlan, J., plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Joint Traffic 
Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898)). 
 86. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 411 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 87. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1077 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 88. Id. at 1081. 
 89. Id. at 1080. 
 90. Id. at 1080–81. 
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most he can for his services, and that of society, disguised under the name 
of capital, to get his services for the least possible return,” Holmes wrote in 
Vegelahn, was only “[o]ne of the eternal conflicts out of which life is made 
up.”91  No government, he added, could change that reality.  “Combination 
on the one side is patent and powerful.  Combination on the other is the 
necessary and desirable counterpart, if the battle is to be carried on in a fair 
and equal way.”92  “It seems to me futile,” he concluded, “to set our faces 
against [the] tendency [to combine].  Whether beneficial on the whole, as I 
think it, or detrimental, it is inevitable, unless the fundamental axioms of 
society, and even the fundamental conditions of life, are to be changed.”93 
II. THE MECHANICS OF HOLMES’S LOCHNER DISSENT 
In Part I, I explained that Holmes broke the world up into a positivistic 
ultimate view and an existential proximate view, and used a theory of 
combinations to understand social life, including disputes between business 
owners and organized workers.  In this Part, I use Holmes’s dissenting 
opinion in Lochner to illustrate how his jurisprudence was shaped by his 
acceptance of positivism and by his commitment to his theory of 
combinations.  To do that, I first contextualize Holmes’s dissent by 
examining the rise of liberty of contract, a legal doctrine Holmes’s 
colleagues thought was critical to the Lochner case.  Then I walk through 
the mechanics of Lochner’s majority opinion and main dissent, which 
his dissent responds to.  My overall argument will be that the          
ultimate-proximate divide and the law of combinations provide the 
foundation on which Holmes built his Lochner opinion. 
A. Liberty of Contract 
The right to liberty of contract is a now-defunct constitutional 
doctrine
94
 that says the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 91. Id. at 1081. 
 92. Id.  In this passage, Holmes specifically made the case that allowing employees to 
combine was a matter of fairness.  In doing so, he was in the mainstream of his day.  Two 
years before Vegelahn, the presidentially appointed United States Strike Commission issued 
a report on the Pullman Strike in which it made the same argument: “[S]o long as railroads 
are . . . permitted to combine to fix wages and for their joint protection, it would be rank 
injustice to deny the right of all labor upon railroads to unite for similar purposes.”  U.S. 
STRIKE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CHICAGO STRIKE OF JUNE-JULY, 1894, at xxxi (1895). 
 93. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 94. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391–400 (1937) (overruling 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), a case in which the Court applied the 
right to liberty of contract); JAMES R. STONER, JR., COMMON-LAW LIBERTY: RETHINKING 
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protects “the right to purchase or to sell labor”95 from unreasonable 
regulations.
96
  However, because the Due Process Clause never mentions 
liberty of contract, understanding how that right came to be requires some 
explanation.  As law professor David Bernstein noted in his 2003 article 
Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised, the right to contract arose from a brew 
of American constitutional theory, natural law, and Anglo-American 
historicism.
97
 
“When leading postbellum lawyers considered American 
constitutionalism,” Bernstein explained, 
they thought of it not as being solely the powers and prohibitions contained 
within the four corners of a document.  Rather, they took a cue from British 
constitutional theorists, who posited that England had a “constitution” 
despite the absence of any such written document.  American theorists 
argued that the United States, too, had an unwritten constitution, one that 
complemented and supplemented the written document. . . . 
  In England, the constitution only restrained the monarchy and was 
safeguarded by Parliament, leading to a system of legislative supremacy.  
In the United States, [however], the federal government was a government 
of limited and enumerated powers, restrained by a written Constitution and, 
many thought, natural rights, enforceable by the judiciary.
98
 
Reconstruction and Gilded Age judges also enforced the unwritten 
constitution against the states.  Before the country adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1868, “states were thought to be sovereign and could only 
be restrained by express constitutional provisions.”99  However, not long 
after the Amendment was adopted, judges began to see it as initiating a 
new era in the federal government’s relationship with state governments.100 
Specifically, postbellum judges believed the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause—which prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”101—required a new 
 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 144 (2003) (“After [the 1937 case] West Coast 
Hotel, . . . liberty of contract is never used again by the Supreme Court to strike a 
statute . . . .”). 
 95. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (Peckham, J.). 
 96. See id. (Peckham, J.) (“Both property and liberty are held on such reasonable 
conditions as may be imposed by the governing power of the State . . . and with such 
conditions the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere.”). 
 97. See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the 
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 (2003). 
 98. Id. at 31–32 (footnote omitted). 
 99. Id. at 32. 
 100. See id. at 31–35. 
 101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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understanding of American federalism.
102
  “[They] argued that the Clause 
gave courts the right and obligation to enforce against the states not just the 
largely procedural rights protected by the Magna Carta and long-standing 
Anglo-American traditions, but all fundamental individual rights deemed 
essential to the development of American liberty . . . .”103  So whereas 
before the Fourteenth Amendment became law, the state legislatures and 
state courts were the “ultimate guardians of the people’s liberty at the state 
and local levels,”104 after the Amendment was adopted, the federal courts 
became the final defenders of liberty.  The Due Process Clause, judges 
thought, required them to directly enforce unwritten constitutional 
guarantees of liberty against the states.
105
 
When judges enforced the unwritten constitution against the states, 
they saw themselves as protecting fundamental natural rights that “antedate 
positive law and that can be discovered through human reason.”106  By 
1905, when the Court decided Lochner, 
a virtual consensus seems to have developed among the [Supreme Court] 
Justices that due process principles protected fundamental [natural] rights 
that were antecedent to government. . . .  The main dispute in the Court was 
not over the existence of fundamental judicially-enforceable unenumerated 
rights, nor was the dispute primarily about the content of those 
rights. . . .  Rather, . . . the Justices disagreed about how vigorously 
fundamental rights should be enforced against the states . . . .
107
 
Despite the wide agreement on the revolution sparked by the Due 
Process Clause, the judges who wanted to follow through with the new 
federalism still faced a practical problem.  There is no “set formula” for 
defining an unwritten natural right with enough specificity to resolve a 
particular dispute.
108
  However, aside from Holmes,
109
 every Justice on the 
 
 102. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 34. 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. at 32. 
 105. See id. at 32. 
 106. Id. at 35. 
 107. Id. at 37–38. 
 108. Id. at 38. 
 109. In his Lochner dissent, Holmes mentioned the “fundamental principles as they have 
been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”  Lochner v. New York, 198 
U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  Bernstein characterizes that comment as 
Holmes’s “grudging[] acknowledge[ment]” that courts were required to apply fundamental 
natural rights against the states.  Bernstein, supra note 97, at 38.  However, as I explain infra 
Section II.C, with that comment Holmes was merely adding broad criteria to a 
reasonableness test. 
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Lochner Court found a way to overcome that problem through a process 
Bernstein describes as “an implicit legal historicism.”110 
Judges of the Lochner period believed they could identify particular 
fundamental natural rights “through historical studies” rather than 
“rationalistic introspection.”111  “One scholar,” Bernstein noted, “described 
the historicism of the Lochner era as the conceiving of law ‘as an evolving 
product of the mutual interaction of race, culture, reason, and events.’”112  
“Historicists of the time,” Bernstein went on to explain, “believed that 
‘societies, social norms, and institutions are the outgrowth of continuous 
change effected by secular causes’ but that they ‘evolve according to moral 
ordering principles that are discoverable through historical studies.’”113  So 
Lochner-era judges did not think of natural rights theory as a purely 
abstract system of limits on state power and constitutional guarantees.  
Instead, they thought of the theory “‘as confirmation of rights they thought 
were embedded’ in the Anglo-American tradition.”114 
Aided by the new federalism set off by the Fourteenth Amendment 
and working from a base of natural rights and historicism, the 1890s Fuller 
Court developed the idea that the Due Process Clause recognizes a right to 
contract.  As the Gilded Age gave way to the Progressive Era, “labor unrest 
and Populist agitation . . . fueled fears” among many of the country’s 
conservatives, business owners, and governing elite “of imminent 
Socialism . . . .”115  In that climate, many jurists began to view “[t]he right 
to pursue an occupation free from unreasonable government interference” 
as a vital means of protecting “private enterprise.”116  In the words of 
Henry Weismann, one of the attorneys who challenged the law at issue in 
 
 110. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 39. 
 111. Id. (quoting Stephen A. Siegel, Historism in Late Nineteenth-Century 
Constitutional Thought, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1431, 1435 (1990)). 
 112. Id. (quoting Siegel, supra note 111, at 1435). 
 113. Id. (quoting Siegel, supra note 111, at 1438). 
 114. Id. at 38 (quoting Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American 
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 83 (1991)). 
 115. Id. at 41; see also Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History 
of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 751, 792 
(2009) (“The great issue in the Lochner era was labor and its association with socialism.”). 
 116. Bernstein, supra note 97, at 41–42; see generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. 
New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1469, 1500–05 (2005) 
[hereinafter Centennial Retrospective] (discussing the press’s reaction to the Court’s 
Lochner decision); Nourse, supra note 115, at 778–79 (also noting the reception of the 
Lochner decision by the national press). 
21
Yoder: The Americanism of Justice Holmes
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2017
374 CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:2 
Lochner,
117
 when the Court first struck down a labor law on               
liberty-of-contract grounds, they fired “a warning [shot] to the Radicals and 
Socialists . . . and [gave] inspiration to those who still believe in the       
old-time doctrines of Americanism.”118 
Within the span of a few years, the Fuller Court would both introduce 
liberty of contract and defend it as a right protected by the Due Process 
Clause.  The effort began with Justice Henry Brown’s opinion for the Court 
in the 1894 case Lawton v. Steele.
119
  In Lawton, as part of a discussion on 
the extent of states’ inherent powers, Brown tossed in the idea that state 
legislatures “may not . . . arbitrarily interfere with private business, or 
impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations.”120  
The following year in Frisbie v. United States,
121
 Justice David Brewer 
sharpened Brown’s pronouncement by “conced[ing] that . . . among the 
inalienable rights” guaranteed by the Constitution “is that of the liberty of 
contract.”122  But it was not until the 1897 case Allgeyer v. Louisiana123 that 
the Court finally took full advantage of the new federalism, natural rights 
theory, and historicism, to make a full-throated argument that the Due 
Process Clause guarantees a right to contract. 
Writing for the Allgeyer Court, Justice Rufus Peckham’s holding was 
relatively narrow: “[A] citizen of a state, under the [Due Process Clause, 
has] a right to contract outside of the state for insurance on his property.”124  
But in “broad dicta,”125 he signaled to the nation that the Court was ready to 
invalidate laws under the Due Process Clause for violating the right to 
contract.  “The liberty mentioned in [the Due Process Clause,]” Peckham 
wrote, 
is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen . . . to live and work where he 
will, to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood 
or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be 
 
 117. See PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 111–28 
(1998).  Although in Lochner Weismann opposed the ten-hour provision, he was also 
instrumental in getting the law passed.  See id. at 52–60. 
 118. Centennial Retrospective, supra note 116, at 1501–02 (quoting Henry Weissman, 
Celebration of Victory (1905), in BAKERS REV., June 1905, at 41, 41). 
 119. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
 120. Id. at 137 (Brown, J.). 
 121. Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160 (1895). 
 122. Id. at 165 (Brewer, J.). 
 123. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1896). 
 124. Id. at 590–91 (Peckham, J.). 
 125. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 44. 
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proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful 
conclusion the purposes above mentioned.
126
 
Peckham then defended the new interpretation of the Due Process Clause 
with appeals to natural law and historicism.  Peckham first characterized 
liberty of contract as an “inalienable right”127 and said that it had been 
given to “all men . . . by their Creator.”128  After that, he defended the right 
to contract as fundamental to Anglo-American freedom, calling it a “large 
ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen,”129 “one of the privileges of a 
citizen of the United States,”130 and “a material part of the liberty of the 
citizen.”131  The Due Process Clause, according to Peckham, required 
courts to enforce the fundamental and natural right to liberty of contract 
against the states.  In his estimation, protecting American liberty meant 
complementing and supplementing the Due Process Clause with that right. 
Although when the Court decided Allgeyer in 1897 it had yet to rely 
on the new doctrine, Peckham’s strong endorsement of it made it ready to 
use in future cases.  And as it happened, Lochner—which came tumbling 
down the pike in 1905—was one of those cases. 
B. Peckham’s Majority Lochner Opinion and Harlan’s Dissent 
As in Allgeyer, Peckham wrote the majority opinion in the 1905 
Lochner case.
132
  There, he considered a challenge to a provision in New 
York’s Bakeshop Act that limited bakers to working ten hours per day and 
sixty hours per week.
133
  For Peckham, the relevant legal framework began 
with New York’s general power to pass legislation—a power that exists “in 
the sovereignty of each State . . . somewhat vaguely termed police 
powers.”134  Whereas in the early days of the Republic, states could pass 
laws limiting individuals’ liberty without federal supervision,135 after the 
 
 126. Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589. 
 127. Id. (quoting Butchers’ Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746, 762 (1884) 
(Bradley, J., concurring)). 
 128. Id. (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 762). 
 129. Id. at 590 (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 762). 
 130. Id. (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 764). 
 131. Id. (quoting Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 765). 
 132. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
 133. See id. at 46 n.1 (1905) (reproducing the language of the ten-hour provision). 
 134. Id. at 53 (Peckham, J.) (emphasis added). 
 135. See id. at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (describing the “inherent power of the States” 
as “embrac[ing] everything within the territory of the State not surrendered to the [Federal] 
Government”  (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824))); see also id. at 56 (“It 
must, of course, be conceded that there is a limit to the valid exercise of the police power by 
the State. . . .  Otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment would have no efficacy.”). 
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adoption of the Due Process Clause judges would review police-power 
laws to determine whether they invaded individuals’ fundamental natural 
rights.
136
  Noting that the courts had not yet exactly described
137
 how 
fundamental rights fit together with states’ police powers, Peckham 
checked off a few purposes for enacting police-power laws that were by 
then well established: “safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the 
public.”138 
After setting up a framework that used fundamental rights to limit the 
reach of states’ police powers, Peckham laid out his test for determining 
whether a particular law was “within the police power of [a] State”139 or 
whether it ventured into territory protected by a fundamental right.
140
  A 
law is a “valid” police-power measure, Peckham explained in a critical 
passage, if it has a “direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end itself 
must be appropriate and legitimate.”141 
Peckham envisioned a clean distinction between a law that was a valid 
police-power measure, and a law that infringed a fundamental natural right.  
In the event a judge was presented with a Due Process challenge to a 
“border” law142—that is, a law that infringes a fundamental right for the 
ostensible purpose of achieving a recognized police-power         
objective—Peckham believed that an investigation of the underlying facts 
would show whether the law was valid.
143
  If, as a matter of fact, the law 
genuinely furthers a police-power objective, then it had to be upheld as a 
law “the Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to interfere [with].”144  
The Due Process Clause, Peckham believed, allows for “legitimate” 
exceptions.
145
 
When Peckham turned to the ten-hour law, it was obvious to him that 
by restricting the terms over which master bakers and bakers could bargain, 
the provision had “necessarily interfere[d] with the [fundamental natural] 
 
 136. See id. at 57 (saying that the question of whether a police-power measure steps on a 
right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause “must be answered by the court”). 
 137. Id. at 53. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 57. 
 140. See id. at 58 (“We think the limit of the police power has been reached and passed 
in this case.”). 
 141. Id. at 57–58. 
 142. Id. at 54. 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at 53. 
 145. Id. 
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right of contract” mentioned in Allgeyer.146  As a result, the law could only 
be upheld as valid if a factual inquiry revealed that an established exception 
applied.  After brushing off the ideas that the ten-hour law could be “valid 
as a labor law” or valid as a measure to protect the public’s health,147 
Peckham announced that “[t]he law must be upheld, if at all, as a law 
pertaining to the health of the individual engaged in the occupation of a 
baker.”148 
Peckham’s first order of business was to clarify that a law to protect 
workers’ health must apply to jobs that rise to an unusual level of 
unhealthfulness.
149
  Although he never defined where that level was, he was 
willing to say that “[t]here must be more than . . . the possible existence of 
some small amount of unhealthiness.”150  Having thus sketched his 
approach to the ten-hour provision, Peckham’s analysis was simple.  
Apparently relying on statistics contained in the appendix to the plaintiff’s 
brief,
151
 Peckham rejected the idea that the baking trade rose to a level of 
unhealthfulness that would warrant interference with the right to contract: 
In looking through statistics regarding all trades and occupations, it may be 
true that the trade of baker does not appear to be as healthy as some other 
trades, and is also vastly more healthy than still others.  To the common 
understanding the trade of baker has never been regarded as an unhealthy 
one.
152
 
Because the baking trade was not an unusually unhealthy one, Peckham 
concluded, “the limit of the police power has been reached and passed in 
 
 146. Id.  Before coming to that conclusion, Peckham was careful to point out that the 
maximum-hours law was not intended to make up for bakers’ inability to freely exercise 
their wills.  “[T]he statute was [not] intended to meet a case of involuntary labor,” Peckham 
wrote.  Id. at 52.  Furthermore, “There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in 
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades or manual occupations . . . .  They are in no 
sense wards of the State.”  Id. at 57. 
 147. Id. at 57. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See id. at 59. (“[T]he trade of baker . . . is . . . vastly more healthy than [other 
trades].  To the common understanding, the trade of a baker has never been regarded as an 
unhealthy one.”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See David E. Bernstein, The Story of Lochner v. New York: Impediment to the 
Growth of the Regulatory State, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 325, 344 (Michael C. 
Dorf ed., 2004). 
 152. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59.  Peckham followed up his apparent reference to the 
appendix by saying, “To the common understanding, the trade of a baker has never been 
regarded as an unhealthy one.”  Id.  But by that point, Peckham had already mentioned a 
judge on the New York Court of Appeals who specifically thought otherwise.  Id. at 58.  So, 
the appendix provides better support for Peckham’s argument. 
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this case.”153  “The act is not, within any fair meaning of the term, a health 
law, but is an illegal interference with the [right to contract], both [of] 
employers and employe[e]s . . . .”154 
Much like Peckham’s thinking started out with states’ police powers, 
so did Harlan’s in his main Lochner dissent.  “[W]hat is called the police 
power of the State,” Harlan wrote in the opening line of his opinion, “has 
been uniformly recognized . . . by the . . . courts.”155  Harlan also agreed 
with Peckham that there were areas that police powers could not go.  The 
Due Process Clause protects certain natural rights, Harlan argued,
156
 
“which cannot be violated even under the sanction of direct legislative 
enactment.”157  Harlan even echoed Peckham’s observation that the border 
between states’ police powers and fundamental rights had yet to be fully 
mapped out.  The “boundaries of what is called the police power of the 
State,” Harlan explained as he opened his dissent, “extends at least to the 
protection of the lives, the health and the safety of the public.”158 
But unlike Peckham, Harlan would not independently review facts to 
determine whether a police-power measure was valid.  Rather than using 
Peckham’s means-end test, Harlan put his own test forward.  “[T]he rule is 
universal,” Harlan said with the support of a handful of authorities, “that a 
legislative enactment . . . is never to be disregarded or held invalid unless it 
be, beyond question, plainly and palpably in excess of legislative 
power.”159  He tied his deferential test to his own understanding of the new 
federal system created by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Deference to state 
legislatures, Harlan maintained, “necessarily results from the principle that 
the health and safety of the people of a State are primarily for the State to 
 
 153. Id. at 58. 
 154. Id. at 61. 
 155. Id. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 156. See id. at 73–74 (saying that “[t]he preservation of the [inherent] powers of the 
States is quite as vital as the preservation of the [federal government’s] power[]” to “void 
[state laws] under the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 157. Id. at 68.  In this passage Harlan actually said there is a right to contract that cannot 
be violated by direct regulation.  He did not mention fundamental natural rights in general.  
However, at the beginning of his opinion, he said the right to contract was just one of the 
“inherent rights belonging to everyone.”  Id. at 65.  Consequently, it is clear that, like 
Peckham, Harlan thought fundamental natural rights in general limited the reach of states’ 
police powers. 
 158. Id. at 65.  Later in his opinion, Harlan said the right to contract can “be subjected to 
regulations designed . . . to promote the general welfare or to guard the public health, the 
public morals or the public safety.”  Id. at 67.  Then towards the end of his opinion, Harlan 
echoed his original formulation, saying that states have the “inherent power . . . to care for 
the lives, health and well-being of their citizens.”  Id. at 73. 
 159. Id. at 68. 
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guard and protect.”160  To subject the states to more demanding 
supervision, he reasoned, would “enlarg[e] the scope of the Amendment far 
beyond its original purpose.”161 
After establishing his framework, Harlan turned his attention to the 
maximum-hours law.  Like Peckham, Harlan relied on Allgeyer for the idea 
that the right to contract put a limit on how far a state’s police power could 
go.
162
  Unlike Peckham, however, he did not introduce the ten-hour 
provision as “necessarily interfer[ing] with the right of contract.”163  
Instead, Harlan began his opinion by presuming that the provision was a 
valid police-power measure to protect bakers’ health.164  “If there be doubt 
as to the validity of the statute, that doubt must therefore be resolved in 
favor of its validity . . . .  [T]he burden of [proving the statute is plainly and 
palpably unconstitutional] . . . is upon those who assert it to be 
unconstitutional.”165  And that was a burden, Harlan argued, that could not 
be met. 
Harlan made a straightforward case that the ten-hour law could not 
have plainly and palpably extended beyond New York’s police power.  He 
first appealed to common experience.  “[We] all know[] the air constantly 
breathed by workmen is not as pure and healthful as that to be found in 
some other establishments . . . .”166  Then he supported his appeal to 
general knowledge with a few authorities.  Harlan quoted studies and 
statistics that characterized the profession of baking as “highly injurious 
to . . . health[;]”167 that described bakers as being “of more delicate health 
than [other] workers[;]”168 and that asserted shorter hours of work 
“improved health.”169  Laymen’s experience, coupled with the support of a 
number of authorities, was all Harlan needed to be confident that the law 
 
 160. Id. at 73. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 65–66 (“[T]he State, in the exercise of its powers, may not unduly 
interfere with right of the citizen to enter into contracts . . . .  This was declared in 
Allgeyer . . . .”); see also id. at 68 (“[T]here is a liberty of contract which cannot be violated 
even under the sanction of direct legislative enactment . . . .”). 
 163. Id. at 53. 
 164. See id. at 69 (“[T]he statute must be taken as expressing the belief of the people of 
New York that . . . labor in excess of sixty hours during a week in [bakeshops] may 
endanger the health of those who thus labor.”). 
 165. Id. at 68 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)). 
 166. Id. at 70. 
 167. Id. (quoting a translated passage likely from LUDWIG HIRT, DIE KRANKHEITEN DER 
ARBEITER: BEITRÄGE FÖRDERUNG DER ÖFFENTLICHEN GESUNDHEITSPFLEGE (1871)). 
 168. Id. (quoting an unidentified source). 
 169. Id. at 71 (quoting STATE OF N.Y., EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS 82 (1901)). 
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did not plainly and palpably go beyond New York’s police power.170  As a 
result, he could not help but conclude that the “[C]ourt will transcend its 
functions if it assumes to annul the statute of New York.”171 
C. Holmes’s Lochner Dissent 
While appeals to natural rights were critical in Peckham’s and 
Harlan’s respective resolutions of the Lochner case, Holmes was unable to 
follow along in their adventure.  His positivism would not allow it.  In his 
1918 article Natural Law, Holmes broke down the belief in natural law into 
what he took to be its true origin: a readiness to draw unscientific 
conclusions from everyday experience and anthropological facts.
172
  “The 
jurists who believe in natural law seem to me to be in that naïve state of 
mind that accepts what has been familiar and accepted by all men 
everywhere,”173 Holmes observed as he pursued natural-rights thinking to 
its root: 
Reason working on experience does tell us, no doubt, that if [we wish to 
live in society], we can do it only on [certain] terms. . . .  If I do live with 
others they tell me that I must do and abstain from doing various things or 
they will put the screws on to me.  I believe that they will, and being of the 
same mind as to their conduct I not only accept the rules but come in time 
to accept them with sympathy and emotional affirmation and begin to talk 
about duties and rights.
174
 
Rather than relying on natural law, Holmes used a theory of the 
judicial role to address specific conflicts that arose under vague 
constitutional provisions.  Holmes borrowed the architecture of his theory 
from James Bradley Thayer—a law professor who had been a partner at the 
firm where he began his legal career.
175
  In his influential 1893 article The 
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
176
 
 
 170. Harlan acknowledged that the question as to whether the ten-hour law protects 
bakers’ health is one which “there is room for debate and for an honest difference of 
opinion.”  Id. at 72. 
 171. Id. at 70. 
 172. OLIVER W. HOLMES, Natural Law, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 180, 
181.  Holmes’s article is also reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 310. 
 173. Natural Law, in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 180, 181. 
 174. Id. at 181–82.  A couple of years earlier, in a letter to Laski, Holmes was blunter in 
his estimation of natural law, stating “[a]ll my life I have sneered at the natural rights of 
man.”  Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at xxiv, xxv. 
 175. See WHITE, supra note 22, at 95, 197. 
 176. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional 
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
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Thayer rejected the doctrine of judicial supremacy—the idea that judges 
have the “authority to set [their] opinions about the correct meaning of the 
Constitution above those of Congress, the president, [and] the 
electorate.”177  Instead, as legal scholar Larry Kramer has explained, 
Thayer’s article taught that the “primary authority to interpret the 
Constitution is outside the courts and that judicial authority to declare 
statutes unconstitutional is, at most, a subordinate, secondary check.”178 
Despite how it may sound to modern ears, Thayer’s rejection of 
judicial supremacy was not new or even necessarily radical.  It was instead 
a view of the American judiciary that had deep roots and historical support 
at the highest levels of government.  Most of Thayer’s article, in fact, is an 
ordered collection of old statements about the judicial role, including views 
that had been aired out by Constitutional Convention delegates
179
 and by 
Supreme Court Justices.
180
  Although Thayer did not take the time to 
contextualize the numerous remarks he highlighted in his article, Kramer 
was happy to do the job for him.  In his 2012 paper Judicial Supremacy 
and the End of Judicial Restraint,
181
 Kramer explained that the sources 
Thayer relied on were part of a single and well-established school of 
constitutional thought he calls popular constitutionalism.
182
  That school, 
Kramer wrote, had been “embraced and advocated” by none other than the 
Democratic-Republican Party, the party of Thomas Jefferson.
183
 
Popular constitutionalism stands for the idea that the “primary 
authority to interpret . . . constitutional law rest[s] actively in the 
community . . . .”184  And Jeffersonians, the original popular 
 
 177. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 7 
(2007). 
 178. Larry D. Kramer, Judicial Supremacy and the End of Judicial Restraint, 100 CALIF. 
L. REV. 621, 628 (2012); see Thayer, supra note 176, at 148 (“[T]he judicial question [of 
what the legislature may do] is a secondary one.  The legislature in determining what shall 
be done . . . does not divide its duty with the judges, nor must it conform to their conception 
of what is prudent or reasonable legislation.”). 
 179. See, e.g., Thayer, supra note 176, at 140–41 (quoting Constitutional Convention 
delegate James Wilson as saying that “laws might be dangerous and destructive, and yet not 
so ‘unconstitutional as to justify the judges in refusing to give them effect.’”). 
 180. See, e.g., id. at 141 (quoting Justice William Patterson as arguing that “in order to 
justify the court in declaring any law void, there must be ‘a clear and unequivocal breach of 
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.’”). 
 181. See Kramer, supra note 178. 
 182. See Kramer, supra note 178, at 622. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. (italics omitted).  For a more detailed discussion of what Kramer means by 
popular constitutionalism, see Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, 
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constitutionalists, would have thought the community had two means of 
asserting its prerogative.  In the first instance, the community directly 
checked the constitutionality of legislation.  If a legislature passed a law 
that most people rejected as unconstitutional, the community could push 
back on it “through protests, petitions, elections, and other forms of direct 
popular action.”185  It was only as a secondary check that judicial review 
came into the picture.
186
  Under the Jeffersonian theory, a judge acted as an 
“agent[] of the people.”187  A judge’s proper role was merely to rule in 
accordance with the community’s understanding of what the Constitution 
meant.  A Jeffersonian judge would only strike a law down as 
unconstitutional under “conditions of near certainty—because the 
[community] was capable of acting on its own and retained primary 
responsibility for doing so at all times.”188 
In writing his article, however, Thayer had a purpose beyond merely 
digging up a bygone understanding of the judicial role.  “[H]is particular 
point was to . . . . restore the older, historically preeminent [Jeffersonian] 
idea of judicial authority—including its notions of self-restraint and 
deference—and to reject the Gilded Age Court’s pretensions to [judicial] 
supremacy.”189  But in an effort to close the sale on an old theory, Thayer 
updated it to make it more palatable for his time.  “[T]he idea of direct 
popular supervision—assumed and widely accepted in the Early 
Republic—no longer made sense [in Thayer’s day].”190  So in advocating 
for popular constitutionalism, Thayer “[i]nstead . . . assumed that the 
political branches of government, and especially the legislature, offer the 
best expression of popular views.”191  But even if Thayer thought it best to 
whittle the Jeffersonian theory’s first check on legislatures down to regular 
elections and ordinary lobbying efforts, he preserved the larger point in 
full: judges should defer to legislatures’ opinions as to what the 
Constitution means. 
Mere days after Thayer published his article, Holmes wrote to 
congratulate him and express his agreement with his argument.  “I have 
read your article,” Holmes told Thayer, “and . . . . [s]ubstantially I agree 
 
Popular Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 
697 (2007). 
 185. Kramer, supra note 178, at 625. 
 186. A “minority” of Jeffersonian popular constitutionalists, however, thought “judicial 
review in any form was improper.”  Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 625–26. 
 189. Id. at 628. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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with it heartily . . . .”192  Although Holmes suggested that Thayer may have 
read too much into old statements that spoke approvingly of judicial 
deference—statements that Thayer acknowledged could have been “mere 
courteous and smoothly transmitted platitude[s]”193—he had “no doubt” of 
the “usefulness of insisting upon” popular constitutionalism at a time when 
judicial supremacy had been advanced by “some of the other judges.”194  
Like Thayer, Holmes did not think judges should be in the business of 
applying elaborate constitutional theories to the particular cases they had to 
resolve.  He instead thought judges should be ready to validate 
constitutional rationales that were broadly held, even if they did not agree 
with them. 
When Holmes wrote to Thayer, he did not go so far as to say that 
Thayer’s article convinced him to accept any new major views.  “[Y]our 
article . . . makes explicit,” Holmes wrote, “the point of view from which 
implicitly I have approached Constitutional questions . . . .”195  
Nevertheless, Holmes was proud to say that he had borrowed a key element 
of Thayer’s article for his own use.  When Thayer compiled passages that 
demonstrated historical support for popular constitutionalism, he organized 
them so as to line up with two related propositions.  After seeing what 
those propositions were, Holmes revealed that he would adopt them for his 
own use, telling Thayer, “I believe in your formula.”196 
Thayer’s first proposition identified a judge’s proper role.  When a 
judge considers the constitutionality of a statute, he should 
“merely . . . fix[] the outside border” of acceptable constitutional 
rationales.
197
 
Well before Holmes read Thayer’s article, he believed that legislatures 
were worthy of respect because the most powerful groups in a community 
 
 192. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to James B. Thayer (Nov. 2, 1893), in David Luban, 
Justice Holmes and the Metaphysics of Judicial Restraint, 44 DUKE L.J. 449, 462 n.34 
(1994). 
 193. Thayer, supra note 176, at 145. 
 194. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to James B. Thayer (Nov. 2, 1893), in Luban, supra 
note 192, at 462 n.34.  Compare LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 215 (2004) (saying that between Reconstruction 
and the New Deal, neither popular constitutionalism nor judicial supremacy had clearly 
gained the upper hand), with Keith E. Whittington, Give “The People” What They Want?, 
81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911, 918–20 (2006) (arguing that between Abraham Lincoln’s and 
Franklin Roosevelt’s respective presidencies, judicial supremacy was the dominant view). 
 195. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to James B. Thayer (Nov. 2, 1893), in Luban, supra 
note 192, at 462 n.34. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Thayer, supra note 176, at 148. 
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used them to demonstrate their power.
198
  In his 1873 article The Gas 
Stokers’ Strike,199 for example, Holmes argued that people join all sorts of 
combinations to get more of what they want.  Political combinations, he 
was careful to point out, are no different.  In a short passage outlining his 
theory of legislative power, Holmes pushed the idea that because people 
instinctively look out for their own interests, nothing will ever stop them 
from passing laws that benefit themselves at a cost to others: 
The struggle for life, undoubtedly, is constantly putting the interests of men 
at variance with those of the lower animals.  And the struggle does not stop 
in the ascending scale with the monkeys, but is equally the law of human 
existence. . . . [T]his is as true in legislation as in any other form of 
corporate action. . . .  [W]hatever body may possess the supreme power for 
the moment is certain to have interests inconsistent with others which have 
competed unsuccessfully.
200
 
Because political combinations are simply outer manifestations of 
deep evolutionary drives, it would be “idle” to try to stop them.201  “As 
long as . . . [human] instinct[s] remain[],” Holmes maintained several years 
later in The Common Law, “it will be more comfortable for the law to 
satisfy [them] in an orderly manner . . . .  If it should do otherwise, it would 
become a matter for pedagogues, wholly devoid of reality.”202  The lesson 
Holmes took from his scientific worldview was that power will always find 
a way to exert itself.  To deny that is to deny how people have always 
behaved.  So in The Gas Stokers’ Strike, when Holmes concluded his 
discussion on what legislation is, he argued that the actual forces behind 
particular laws had to be respected: “The more powerful interests must be 
more or less reflected in legislation; which, like every other device of man 
or beast, must tend in the long run to aid the survival of the fittest.”203 
 
 198. See, e.g., OLIVER W. HOLMES, Cooley and Constitutional Limitations, in BOOK 
NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 97, 98–99 (“Where the sovereign 
power resides at any time, and what is the sovereign will, are questions of fact.  But the old 
constitution is an admitted expression of the sovereign will, and that assures us that no other 
is authentic which does not come through certain channels.  The courts may properly abide 
by that until they see that the new manifestation is not only unmistakable, but irresistible.”). 
 199. The Gas Stokers’ Strike, supra note 36, at 582. 
 200. Id. at 107–08. 
 201. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Sept. 15, 1916), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at xxiv, xxv (“Law also as well as sovereignty is a fact.  If in fact 
Catholics or atheists are proscribed and the screws put on, it seems to me idle to say that it 
[ought not be] because [it goes against] a theory that you and I happen to hold . . . .”). 
 202. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 213 (1881) [hereinafter THE 
COMMON LAW]. 
 203. The Gas Stokers’ Strike, supra note 36, at 583. 
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Thayer’s second proposition was a reasonableness test.  Statutes 
falling outside the border of acceptable constitutional rationales are those 
where legislators “have not merely made a mistake, but have made a very 
clear one,—so clear that it is not open to rational question.”204 
Thayer’s reasonableness test ensured that a judge remained deferential 
on constitutional questions.  If a judge should be ready to validate statutes 
backed by a variety of constitutional rationales, then he should only strike 
down laws that embody constitutional theories that no reasonable person 
could hold.  Following Thayer’s lead, Holmes would later use the 
reasonableness test for the same purpose.
205
  But Holmes also had practical 
considerations in mind.  In a 1912 letter to Sheehan, tucked away in a 
passage in which he described how his understanding of his role as a judge 
required a healthy dose of self-restraint, Holmes defended his habit of 
looking only at the modest question of reasonableness: 
One of the queer aspects of duty is when one is called on to sustain or 
enforce laws that one believes to be economically wrong and do more harm 
than good—but as I think we know very little as to what the laws 
pronounced good; as there is no even inarticulate agreement as to the ideal 
to be striven for, and no adequate scientific evidence that this rather than 
that will tend to bring it about if we did agree as to what we want, I settle 
down on simple tests.  I look at it like going to the theatre—if you can pay 
for your ticket and are sure you want to go, I have nothing to say.
206
 
So for Holmes, Thayer’s reasonableness test not only assured that a 
legislature’s primary authority to interpret the Constitution would be left 
intact, it also humbly acknowledged that there were critical questions of 
political prudence and fact that courts had no way of resolving.  As far as 
 
 204. Thayer, supra note 176, at 144. 
 205. According to law professor David Luban, “Holmes adhered to Thayer’s 
[reasonableness test] . . . in several substantive due process dissents,” including his dissents 
in Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); 
and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).  Luban, supra note 192, at 462 & n.33.  As I 
explain infra text accompanying notes 214–32, Holmes used Thayer’s reasonableness test in 
Lochner, as well. 
 206. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Nov. 23, 1912), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 27, 28; see also Oliver W. Holmes, Twenty Years in 
Retrospect, Remarks to a banquet of the Middlesex Bar Association (Dec. 3, 1902), in 
OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 154, 156 (“It has seemed to me that . . . we have 
few scientific data on which to affirm that one rule rather than another has the sanction of 
the universe, [and] that we rarely could be sure that one tends more distinctly than its 
opposite to the survival and welfare of the society where it is practiced . . . .”).  Holmes’s 
Twenty Years in Retrospect speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 
1, at 151. 
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Holmes was concerned, judges did not have special access to wisdom and 
knowledge everyone else lacked. 
Holmes’s Lochner opinion does not give us what we have come to 
expect from a Supreme Court dissent.  As Judge Richard Posner has 
observed, Holmes’s Lochner dissent “does not join issue sharply with the 
majority, is not scrupulous in its treatment of the majority opinion or of 
precedent, [and] is not thoroughly researched.”207  Noting similar defects, 
law professor Akhil Reed Amar has complained that Holmes’s dissent is 
actually not “helpful in explaining exactly what [interests] the Fourteenth 
Amendment [protects].”208  What Posner’s and Amar’s criticisms fail to 
account for, however, is Holmes’s Thayerianism.209  Holmes had no reason 
to argue the Fourteenth Amendment compelled a particular outcome in the 
Lochner case.  He instead thought his job was merely to decide whether the 
constitutional rationale behind the ten-hour law was reasonable.  It was a 
simple process requiring only broad strokes.  Once Holmes’s Lochner 
dissent is considered in that light, the analytical merits of his argument 
become easier to see.
210
 
In staking out a framework to analyze the maximum-hours provision, 
Holmes relied exclusively on Thayer’s first proposition (that a judge should 
be deferential to widely held constitutional theories).  Holmes was so 
convinced of its correctness that, in an opinion that is only a touch over 600 
words, he repeated it three times.  “I strongly believe,” Holmes wrote in the 
 
 207. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 285 
(1988). 
 208. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND 
PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 560 n.23 (2012). 
 209. Later, in a 2012 paper called The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, Posner 
notes Thayer’s influence on Holmes.  See Posner, supra note 15, at 525–28, 543.  In his 
analysis, however, Posner characterizes Holmes’s Lochner dissent as “invo[king] . . . a 
handful of cases” to demonstrate the reasonableness of the ten-hour provision.  Id. at 543.  
However, as I argue infra text accompanying notes 214–32, Holmes actually identified two 
constitutional rationales that could justify the maximum-hours law, and argued for the 
reasonableness of those rationales by appealing to past cases and to three types of laws. 
 210. Law professor Barry Friedman has noticed the influence of Thayer’s article on 
Holmes’s Lochner dissent.  According to Friedman, Holmes “recognized the existence of 
‘liberty to contract’” but thought it conflicted with the New York legislature’s “right” to 
enact the ten-hour law.  Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 
Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1430 (2001) (quoting Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).  Friedman argues that 
Holmes “resolved” the conflict in part by using Thayer’s reasonableness test.  Id. at     
1430–31.  However, as I argue in this Section, Holmes rejected both the right to contract 
and the natural law framework on which it was based, and instead relied on the vision of the 
judicial role Thayer laid out in his article.  Holmes’s Lochner dissent amounted to a 
straightforward argument that the legislature should have its way. 
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opening lines of his dissent, in “the right of a majority to embody their 
opinions in law.”211  Then at the halfway mark, Holmes circled back to 
where he began: “[A constitution] is made for people of fundamentally 
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and 
familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment 
[as to] whether statutes embodying them [are unconstitutional].”212  As he 
wound down his opinion, Holmes again directed his readers’ attention to 
Thayer’s first proposition: “I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth 
Amendment is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a 
dominant opinion.”213 
Having emphasized the idea that judges should do what they could to 
validate legislative majorities’ preferred constitutional theories, Holmes 
spent most of his energy on Thayer’s second proposition—the 
reasonableness test.  In Lochner and elsewhere, Holmes added teeth to 
Thayer’s reasonableness test by describing what qualities a reasonable 
constitutional rationale should have.
214
  Whereas Thayer would invalidate a 
law only when it was clear no rational person could think it was 
constitutional, in Lochner Holmes looked to see whether the constitutional 
theory behind it would “infringe fundamental principles as they have been 
understood by the traditions of our people and our law.”215  He would only 
grant the reasonableness label to the maximum-hours provision if it was 
sufficiently consistent with his understanding of actual Anglo-American 
practices. 
Holmes identified two distinct constitutional rationales for the 
maximum-hours provision and he defended them both as being consistent 
with American culture.  The first ten-hour-law justification Holmes 
identified was one that appealed directly to a police-power objective all of 
his colleagues recognized as legitimate.  “A reasonable man,” Holmes 
wrote in Lochner, “might think [the ten-hour provision] a proper [police 
power] measure on the score of health.”216  In order to demonstrate his 
point, Holmes cited two newly decided cases in which the Supreme Court 
 
 211. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 212. Id. at 76. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See, e.g., Tyson & Bro. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (equating reasonableness with having the support of “a sufficient force of public 
opinion”); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 280 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(equating reasonableness with the moral consensus of “civilized countries”); Otis v. Parker, 
187 U.S. 606, 609 (1903) (Holmes, J.) (equating reasonableness with “relatively 
fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-speaking communities”). 
 215. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 216. Id. 
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validated state measures that limited the terms people could bargain over 
out of concern for the health of some part of the population.  First he cited 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
217
 where the Court upheld a Massachusetts 
measure requiring vaccinations against smallpox because it was a 
reasonable regulation to protect Massachusettsans’ health and safety.218  
Then he cited Holden v. Hardy,
219
 where the Court upheld a Utah law that 
limited the number of hours miners and smelters could work because 
Utahns reasonably thought that the law was necessary to protect their 
health.
220
  Both of these cases showed that Americans had accepted the idea 
that state governments could restrict the right to contract when enough 
people decided a health concern was more important.  The ten-hour law, 
Holmes thought, was well within that tradition.
221
 
The second constitutional rationale for the ten-hour law that Holmes 
defended as meeting the reasonable test was “paternalism,”222 an ideology 
he referred to in private as socialism
223
 and “qualified” versions of it, 
including turn-of-the-century Progressivism.
224
  Holmes was willing to 
view a paternalistic law as being consistent with the liberty guaranteed by 
the Due Process Clause because he did not equate freedom with any 
particular method of protecting free will.  Freedom was instead no different 
than any other moral feeling.  It was an interested, often self-serving 
“generalization[] of the conditions of social welfare expressed in terms of 
emotion.”225 
Depending on their circumstances, two people living in the same 
community at the same time could have conflicting views of what it means 
 
 217. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
 218. See id. at 25–30 (Harlan, J.). 
 219. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
 220. See id. at 398 (Brown, J.). 
 221. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Compare Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Nov. 24, 1912), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 66, 66 (describing public schools and post offices as 
“socialist”), with Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (listing “school laws” and “the Post Office” as 
institutions consistent with paternalism). 
 224. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Nov. 24, 1912), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 66, 66 (calling support for the policies favored by 
Progressive Party candidate Theodore Roosevelt a “yearning for Socialism, qualified or 
not”).  The ten-hour law at issue in Lochner was passed as a result of the efforts of 
unionized bakers and Progressive reformers.  See, e.g., KENS, supra note 117, at 49–63. 
 225. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 8, 1913), in HOLMES AND 
FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912–1934, at 8, 8 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine 
L. Compston eds., 1996) [hereinafter HOLMES & FRANKFURTER]. 
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to secure freedom.  A laissez-faire advocate,
226
 for example, could think 
that prohibiting employers from paying employees to work over a set 
number of hours unfairly limits employers’ freedom to pursue profits.227  
Meanwhile, a paternalist could think that as a practical matter, systematic 
imbalances in bargaining power unfairly deprive employees of the freedom 
to contract for sensible caps on their work hours.
228
  So as Holmes 
understood it, the idea of freedom is influenced by political opinions as to 
which groups should have more, and which should have less.  As applied to 
the maximum-hours law at issue in Lochner, a paternalist would think that 
freedom meant tipping the scales in favor of bakers.  The law was a way to 
secure bakers’ practical liberty. 
In his dissent, Holmes argued that the paternalistic take on bakers’ 
hours met Thayer’s reasonableness test because Anglo-American culture 
has a long history of chipping away at the freedom to contract in order to 
secure redistributive objectives.  A reasonable man, Holmes wrote, could 
“uphold [the ten-hour law] as a first instalment of a general regulation of 
the hours of work.”229  The reasonableness of benefitting bakers by 
narrowing the terms their counterparts could insist on was proven by 
similar measures that state and federal governments had already put into 
place without complaint, including “Sunday laws,” “usury laws,” and “the 
prohibition of lotteries.”230  Holmes also cited Otis v. Parker,231 a case in 
which the Court validated a California constitutional provision that 
prohibited speculation in stocks because Californians reasonably believed it 
was a dangerous practice.
232
  Each of these initiatives, Holmes maintained, 
put limitations on the right to contract so that one group or another could 
obtain benefits they would not otherwise get.  The maximum-hours law 
was no different. 
Although Holmes spent most of his Lochner opinion on his Thayerian 
argument for the constitutionality of the maximum-hours provision, he 
 
 226. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (framing Lochner as a 
disagreement between paternalists and laissez-faire advocates). 
 227. See also Oliver W. Holmes, Draft of opinion of the Court, Keokee Consol. Coke Co. 
v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914), quoted in G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due 
Process and Holmes’s Lochner Dissent, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 87, 110–11 (1997) (“It now is 
recognized by . . . everyone . . . that as a fact freedom may disappear . . . through the power 
of aggregated . . . men . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 228. See also id. (“It now is recognized by . . . everyone . . . that as a fact freedom may 
disappear . . . through the power of aggregated . . . money . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 229. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 230. Id. at 75. 
 231. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606 (1903). 
 232. See id. at 610 (Holmes, J.). 
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added a few lines in which he directly criticized Peckham’s line of 
reasoning.
233
  These lines are the only indications in Lochner of what 
Holmes thought Peckham did wrong.  Holmes’s central charge against 
Peckham was that he failed to adequately distinguish between ultimate and 
proximate points of view. 
To Holmes’s mind, Peckham treated his proximate feeling of  
liberty—packaged as it was in the doctrine of the right to contract—as if it 
had the same authority as an ultimate fact.  “This case,” Holmes began, “is 
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does 
not entertain.”234  Straightforward as it sounds, Holmes’s opening statement 
actually targets two postulates underlying Peckham’s notion of liberty of 
contract.  The first postulate Holmes challenged was natural law.  By 
calling the right to contract an “economic theory,”235 Holmes defied 
Peckham’s assumption that the right had the backing of a universal moral 
system.  Instead, Holmes argued, it was merely a policy preference.  The 
second postulate Holmes challenged with his opening line is the idea that 
history has confirmed the existence of a right to contract.  By pointing out 
that “a large part of the country does not entertain”236 the right to contract, 
Holmes was denying that historical experience was conclusive as to how 
desirable the policy of liberty of contract was.
237
 
Holmes then undermined the authority of liberty to contract by listing 
a number of well-established American initiatives that did not jibe with the 
new right: “school laws,” “the Post Office,” and “every state or municipal 
[public project.]”238  Holmes also listed the Court’s recently decided 
Northern Securities case because in it the Court upheld a statute Holmes 
characterized as “cutting down the liberty to contract by way of 
combination.”239  Together, these examples undermined both of Peckham’s 
implicit postulates.  Public schools, a government-subsidized postal system, 
and public projects undermine the right to contract’s connection to natural 
law because they were broadly accepted despite “tak[ing people’s] money 
for purposes thought desirable, whether [they] like[] it or not.”240  
Similarly, Northern Securities casts doubt on whether history had 
confirmed the right to contract’s usefulness as an economic principle 
 
 233. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. (“If it were a question whether I agreed with [the right to contract] I should 
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind.”). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. (citing N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)). 
 240. Id. 
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because it enacted a widespread understanding that “the general [economic] 
law of competition”241 was more important than the freedom to enter into 
contracts. 
In the end, Holmes’s main problem with Peckham’s opinion was that 
it clashed with his picture of the ultimate world.  His general practice was 
to withhold unimpeachable authority from anything other than perceptible 
facts and verifiable scientific theories.
242
  But Peckham took natural law 
and liberty of contract as starting points even though they had not been 
established as facts, and even though they had not been proven through 
experimentation and observation.  To Holmes’s mind, natural law was 
nothing more than a collection of moral opinions, and liberty of contract 
was simply an economic opinion.  And “[g]eneral propositions,” Holmes 
wrote in his Lochner opinion, “do not decide concrete cases.”243  For 
Holmes, Americans’ habits were facts that had to be reconciled with any 
 
 241. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 338 (Harlan, J., plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. 
Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898)). 
 242. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, given at a 
Tavern Club Dinner (Mar. 4, 1900), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 119, 120 
(“Today the whole domain of truth concerning the visible world belongs to science.”).  
Compare Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law 
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 
30, at 291, 292 (“Science has . . . made it legitimate to put everything to the test of proof.”), 
with Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108, 108 (“I am far from believing [that there are phenomena for 
which no causes can be discovered], but I am entirely ready to believe it on proof.”).  
However, Holmes’s Northern Securities dissent—an opinion he wrote only a year before 
Lochner—is a prominent example of Holmes straying from his usual reliance on facts and 
scientific theories.  In Northern Securities, Holmes argued that the Sherman Antitrust Act 
violated the Commerce Clause because he equated the reach of the Commerce Clause with 
his theory of combinations, and he thought the Act went beyond that limit.  N. Sec. Co., 193 
U.S. at 411 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  As a result, Holmes’s Northern Securities opinion 
rested on his unverified social theory, rather than on facts or on a scientific theory.  Holmes 
seemed to be aware that he had gone beyond the bounds of positivism in that case, telling 
Laski,  
I hope and believe that I am not influenced by my opinion that [the Sherman 
Antitrust Act] is a foolish law.  I have little doubt that the country likes it and I 
always say, as you know, that if my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help 
them.  It’s my job.  
Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 
VOL. 1, supra note 48, at 248, 248–49. 
 243. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 461 (1899) (“A generalization is 
empty so far as it is general.  Its value depends on the number of particulars which it calls 
up . . . .”).  This speech is also reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 210, 
as well as in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 185. 
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jurisprudential theory.  Anything else, he said years later, would be a flight 
into fantasy: 
It now is recognized by legislatures and courts as well as by everyone 
outside of them, that as a fact freedom may disappear on the one side or the 
other through the power of aggregated money or men; . . . and to suppose 
that every other force may exercise its compulsion at will but that 
government has no authority to counteract the pressure with its own is 
absurd.
244
 
III. THE ROMANTIC SIDE OF HOLMES’S LOCHNER DISSENT 
In Part II my main goal was to unpack the critical elements of 
Holmes’s Lochner dissent.  I argued that Holmes took a positivistic 
worldview to his analysis of the Lochner case.  I also isolated the 
individual arguments Holmes made in his Lochner dissent in order to show 
that in that case (1) he rejected judicial supremacy; (2) he used Thayer’s 
two propositions; and (3) he criticized Peckham’s majority opinion for 
failing the test of positivism.  In this Part my goal is more academic.  My 
overall argument is that Holmes connected his understanding of the judicial 
role to his own intellectual salvation.  Although Holmes’s personal faith 
was not the primary reason for his deference to legislatures’ judgments, it 
allowed him to gather up the strength and willpower he needed to go 
through with what he understood to be his duty as a judge. 
In a 1918 letter to the highly respected Judge Learned Hand, Holmes 
explained his personal spin on Thayerianism with a parable.
245
  Holmes 
 
 244. Oliver W. Holmes, Draft of opinion of the Court, Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. 
Taylor, 234 U.S. 224 (1914), quoted in White, supra note 227, at 110–11.  Although 
Holmes removed this passage from the final draft of his Keokee opinion after four of his 
colleagues objected to it, see Charles W. McCurdy, The “Liberty of Contract” Regime in 
American Law, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 161, 183 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 
1998), only months later he covertly made the same point in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 
(1915).  In Coppage, the Court agreed with a liberty-of-contract challenge to a Kansas law, 
id. at 26 (Pitney, J.), while Holmes dissented, id. at 26–27.  But rather than explain his 
reasons in his dissent, Holmes pointed to two previous Supreme Court cases where he 
favored the preferences of a legislative majority over the right to liberty of contract 
(Lochner; and Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)), and to passages in two previous 
Massachusetts cases where he described his theory of combinations (Vegelahn v. Guntner, 
44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896); and Plant v. Woods, 57 N.E. 1011 (Mass. 1900)).  Coppage, 
236 U.S. at 27.  The point Holmes was making in Coppage was the same point he made in 
his draft opinion in Keokee: the right to contract is not an authoritative theory because it 
does not explain the facts of American culture. 
 245. Because both Hand and Holmes were Thayerians, see, e.g., Luban, supra note 192, 
at 451, Holmes’s letter is significant.  The letter was part of a dialogue concerning free 
speech—specifically, whether a Thayerian judge should be less deferential to           
40
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used four characters to describe the different mentalities judges could take 
to their roles.  As the story progresses, it becomes clear that the main 
distinction between his characters is their respective attitudes toward 
reformers.  The implicit question Holmes presented with his parable is, 
how should a judge feel about a radical who seems poised to change the 
community around him?  Holmes used his characters to sketch four distinct 
attitudes, which are as follows: 
1. The official person would have had contempt for a radical like 
William Lloyd Garrison, who spent decades fighting for the complete and 
immediate end of slavery.  Because Garrison preferred “the very structure 
of society [to] perish . . . than . . . [to] not have his way,”246 the official 
person would not accept Garrison’s legitimacy.  He would only be willing 
to accept the existing order. 
2. The son of Garrison looks at Garrison with more understanding.  He 
would argue that vital reforms always seem threatening at first, but that 
society inevitably adjusts.
247
  From the son of Garrison’s perspective, 
Garrison’s radical campaign against slavery seemed threatening for a time, 
but when slavery finally ended the country was better for it.  The son of 
Garrison, then, is optimistic about what radicals can offer the orthodox. 
3. The philosopher would be willing to give more credit to Garrison 
than even the son of Garrison did.  The philosopher would contend that a 
society’s overall evolution depends on conservative and radical forces’ 
battle for the future.
248
  So unlike the son of Garrison, he would not view 
radicals as mere contributors to mainstream society.  He would instead see 
them as the potential creators of the next orthodoxy. 
4. The ironical man builds from the perspective of the philosopher—
Holmes actually calls him “the ironical man in the back of the 
philosopher’s head.”249  Even while agreeing with the philosopher that 
societies evolve through a series of paradigm shifts, the ironical man has a 
 
political-branch officials when those officials regulate speech.  See generally THOMAS 
HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS MIND—AND 
CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 15–27 (2013); Gerald Gunther, 
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of 
History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 722–45 (1975); Frederic R. Kellogg, Learned Hand and the 
Great Train Ride, 56 AM. SCHOLAR 471, 478–86 (1987).  For our purposes, and as I will 
argue in this Part, Holmes’s letter is noteworthy because he used it as an occasion to identify 
two different mindsets a Thayerian judge could have. 
 246. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther, 
supra note 245, app. at 757. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
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secondary interest in social change: he makes the will of a majority 
something he finds personal meaning in supporting.
250
 
The point of Holmes’s story was to impress on Hand the idea that a 
Thayerian judge should understand his duties both from the perspective of 
the philosopher and from the perspective of the ironical man.  He should 
understand both that the life of a society evolves outside of lawyers’ 
theories of governments and that clearing the way for society to grow can 
be a meaningful activity in its own right. 
As it happens, the three opinions of the Lochner case provide good 
illustrations of each of Holmes’s four characters.  The official person and 
the son of Garrison illustrate the limitations Peckham and Harlan 
respectively placed on New York’s maximum-hours reformers.  
Meanwhile, the philosopher and ironical man provide two levels of insight 
into the approach Holmes took to his Lochner dissent.  So by applying 
Holmes’s parable to the Lochner case, we get a better picture of what 
lesson Holmes had in mind for each character. 
A. The Official Person 
Like the official person, Peckham was suspicious of reform.  In 
Lochner, his assertive method of enforcing the right to contract against 
New York’s legislature prevented the state’s reformers from enacting 
maximum-hours laws in any industry the courts did not think of as 
exceptional.  Outside of a few unusually unhealthy industries, Peckham 
argued, hours of work should not be left up to the “paternal wisdom” of 
state legislatures.
251
  “It is unfortunately true that labor, even in any 
department,” Peckham wrote, “may possibly carry with it the seeds of 
unhealthiness.  But are we all, on that account, at the mercy of legislative 
majorities?”252  Peckham thought not.  In his estimation, allowing states to 
apply maximum-hours laws to any job that might threaten a worker’s 
health would be too risky: 
No trade, no occupation, no mode of earning one’s living, could escape this 
all-pervading power, and the acts of the legislature in limiting the hours of 
labor in all employments would be valid, although such limitation might 
seriously cripple the ability of the laborer to support himself and his 
family.
253
 
 
 250. See infra text accompanying notes 259–306 (examining the significance of 
Holmes’s ironical man). 
 251. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 60 (1905) (Peckham, J.). 
 252. Id. at 59 (Peckham, J.). 
 253. Id. 
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B. The Son of Garrison 
In Lochner, by only preventing maximum-hours-law reformers from 
directly challenging the right to contract, Harlan took the son of Garrison’s 
perspective.  Harlan accepted that reformers had legitimate reasons for 
wanting to limit the right to contract.  In the decades before the Lochner 
case, Harlan wrote in his dissent, there had been “an enormous increase in 
the number of occupations which are dangerous, or so far detrimental to the 
health of the employe[e]s as to demand special precautions for their     
well-being and protection.”254  Striking a balance between workers’ health 
and the right to contract, Harlan went on to say, “is not a question . . . in 
respect of which there . . . can be absolute certainty.”255  Without 
conclusive evidence one way or the other, Harlan reasoned that judges 
should be ready to uphold any workplace reform measure that had a “real 
or substantial relation” to health.256  If a reform law could do that, Harlan 
would uphold it as consistent with the right to contract. 
C. The Philosopher 
By putting almost no restrictions on reform laws, Holmes’s Thayerian 
approach to new social movements mirrored the philosopher’s point of 
view.  As Holmes explained in the 1921 case Truax v. Corrigan,
257
 judges 
should not be in the business of overriding popular reforms: 
There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth 
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the 
making of social experiments that an important part of the community 
desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several States, even 
though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those 
whose judgment I most respect.
258
 
While in Lochner neither Peckham nor Harlan would consider justifying 
the ten-hour law outside of the newly established liberty of contract 
 
 254. Id. at 66 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391–92 
(1898)). 
 255. Id. at 72 (emphasis added). 
 256. Id. at 69. 
 257. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921).  In Truax, the Court held that an Arizona 
anti-injunction law violated the Due Process Clause’s protections of liberty and property.  
Id. at 330 (Taft, C.J.).  The Due Process Clause says that a state cannot “deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
The Truax Court also held that the Arizona law violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.  Truax, 257 U.S. at 334 (Taft, C.J.).  The Equal Protection Clause says 
that a state cannot “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 258. Truax, 257 U.S. at 344 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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orthodoxy, Holmes was willing to let New York’s reformers abandon that 
paradigm altogether.  If they had responded to prevailing bakeshop 
conditions with a paternalistic understanding of liberty, he would not use 
the Fourteenth Amendment to get in their way.  The Constitution, he 
believed, was made for them too. 
D. The Ironical Man 
By far the most mysterious perspective Holmes listed in his letter to 
Hand was the ironical man in the back of the philosopher’s head—a second 
angle from which a Thayerian judge could approach his duties.  In his short 
parable, Holmes organized his four characters into a hierarchy.  Holmes 
preferred the son of Garrison to the official person, and the philosopher to 
the son of Garrison.
259
  Incredibly—because the philosopher seems to 
adequately explain the logic a Thayerian judge would use—Holmes 
preferred the ironical man to the philosopher.
260
  For Holmes, it was not 
enough to accept the philosopher’s insight that social evolution was far too 
complicated to predict.  Rather, it was important to pursue the ironical 
man’s project of turning a judge’s duty into something that feels rewarding. 
The ironical man was Holmes’s method of personally investing 
himself in the spirit of a legislative majority.  And in order to do that, he 
had to venture beyond the safety of his positivism.
261
  Holmes’s preferred 
alternative to positivism was his conception of philosophy.
262
  As law 
professor Thomas Grey has explained, Holmes considered “philosophy [to] 
encompass[] all forms of broad and speculative thought that claimed 
intrinsic intellectual interest.  Above all it included what we might call 
social theory—work involving broad generalizations about human society 
that rested loosely on scholarly findings, but which went beyond them to 
guide further research and speculation.”263 
 
 259. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther, 
supra note 245, app. at 757. 
 260. See id. 
 261. See generally Oliver W. Holmes, Remarks regarding Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, given at 
a Tavern Club Dinner (Mar. 4, 1900), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 119, 120 
(“Today the whole domain of truth concerning the visible world belongs to science.”).  This 
speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 48. 
 262. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Dec. 15, 1912), in 
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 28, 29 (“[O]nly the philosophical side of things 
interests me . . . .”). 
 263. Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 841 
(1989); see Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Feb. 6, 1925), in HOLMES-LASKI 
LETTERS VOL. 1, supra note 48, at 705, 706 (“I regard philosophy as simply the broader 
generalizations of thought that can’t lift itself by the slack of its own breeches.”). 
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As early as 1886, Holmes had a fully formed idea of how he could 
enlist his philosophical ideas in the project of going beyond the raw facts of 
a case in such a way as to “live greatly in the law.”264  In a lecture called 
The Profession of the Law, he asked a group of Harvard undergraduates, 
“What is [the work of a legal professional] to my soul?”265  The answer, 
Holmes concluded, was finding what he called an “infinite perspective”266: 
The main part of intellectual education is not the acquisition of facts, but 
learning how to make facts live. . . .  The mark of a master is, that facts 
which before lay scattered in an inorganic mass, when he shoots through 
them the magnetic current of his thought, leap into an organic order, and 
live and bear fruit.
267
 
Although lawyers and judges were bound to deal in facts, Holmes was 
telling the students that any practical grouping of facts could be 
philosophically mastered to an extent that could, at the very highest levels 
at least, be molded into something that is proximately rewarding.
268
 
 
 264. Oliver W. Holmes, The Profession of the Law, Lecture to Undergraduates of 
Harvard University (Feb. 17, 1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 29, 30.  
This speech is also available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 218. 
 265. Id. at 29. 
 266. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
 267. Oliver W. Holmes, The Use of Law Schools, Speech before the Harvard Law 
School Association at Harvard University’s 250th anniversary (Nov. 5, 1886), in 
OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 34, 35–36.  This speech is also reprinted in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 224.  This passage comes from a speech called The Use 
of Law Schools—delivered the same year and place Holmes delivered The Profession of the 
Law.  In The Profession of the Law itself, Holmes described the infinite perspective this 
way: “All that life offers any man from which to start his thinking or his striving is a 
fact. . . .  [Y]our business as thinkers is to make plainer the way from some [fact] to the 
whole of things; to show the rational connection between your fact and the frame of the 
universe.”  Oliver W. Holmes, The Profession of the Law, Lecture to undergraduates of 
Harvard University (Feb. 17, 1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 29, 30. 
 268. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, The Law, Remarks at a Suffolk Bar Association 
Dinner (Feb. 5, 1885), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 221, 224 (“[I]f a man is a 
specialist, it is most desirable that he should also [have broad interests]; that he 
should . . . . be able not only to explain, but to feel; that the ardors of intellectual pursuit 
should be relieved by the charms of art . . . .”).  Holmes’s infinite perspective sheds light on 
another one of Holmes’s major intellectual influences: Ralph Waldo Emerson.  See, e.g., 
MENAND, supra note 34, at 23–25, 57–59.  As Menand points out, Holmes’s infinite 
perspective echoed a passage in Emerson’s 1837 essay The American Scholar.  Id. at 60.  
The passage reads as follows: “[S]how me the sublime presence of the highest spiritual 
cause lurking, . . . in [the] suburbs and extremities of nature; let me see every trifle bristling 
with the polarity that ranges it instantly on an eternal law . . . .”  Ralph Waldo Emerson, The 
American Scholar, in THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF RALPH WALDO EMERSON 43, 57 (Brooks 
Atkinson ed., Modern Library 2000) (1837). 
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The essential facts Lochner presented Holmes with were simple.  A 
legislative majority in New York, invoking the idea that it was unhealthy 
for bakers to work excessively long hours, passed a law limiting bakers to 
ten hours of work per day.  In Holmes’s hands, these humble facts were all 
he needed to “pass in reason from one part [of the universe] to 
another . . . by the path of the air,”269 all the way up to something he could 
proximately connect with. 
Holmes first lifted off from the Lochner facts with philosophy.  The 
philosophical theory he used to explain reformers’ efforts to enact the 
maximum-hours law, of course, was his law of combinations.  Holmes 
believed that by backing the ten-hour law, New York’s unionized bakers 
were behaving like any rational combination should.  They were looking 
out for themselves, even if it came at the expense of others.  If the bakers 
thought they could improve their lives by gathering up political support for 
the ten-hour provision, Holmes would not intervene.  He saw no qualitative 
difference between limiting master bakers’ practical freedom through 
legislation, and limiting it through collective action
270—unions’ traditional 
and more-or-less accepted method of applying pressure on employers.
271
  
Whether their aims were radical or not, the bakers and their Progressive 
boosters had proven their power. 
Once Holmes had built a bridge from the bare facts of the Lochner 
case to the idea that the ten-hour law represented the will of a dominant 
combination, it was not hard for him to complete the circle on his infinite 
perspective.  All that was left for Holmes to do was embrace the bakers’ 
and Progressives’ successful lobbying campaign with his own proximate 
truth.  When Holmes had the ironical man tell Hand that we are all fated to 
 
 269. Oliver W. Holmes, The Profession of the Law, Lecture to Undergraduates of 
Harvard University (Feb. 17, 1886), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 29, 30. 
 270. In fact, a year after Lochner was decided, American Federation of Labor-founder 
Samuel Gompers reported that “to a large extent” New York’s unionized bakers had 
“secured the ten hour work day” by taking collective action.  Samuel Gompers, Speech to 
Quarterly Meeting of Cigarmakers’ Union No. 144 (Apr. 26, 1906), quoted in WILLIAM E. 
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 42 n.28 (1991). 
 271. See generally GERALD G. EGGERT, RAILROAD LABOR DISPUTES: THE BEGINNINGS OF 
FEDERAL STRIKE POLICY 24–225 (1967) (highlighting the judiciary’s role in launching 
federal labor-relations policy between the great railroad strikes of 1877 and the Erdman Act 
of 1898); FORBATH, supra note 270, at 59–127, 193–98 app. B (discussing how courts 
addressed strikes, boycotts, picketing, and secondary actions from the Gilded Age through 
1930); Gary Minda, The Common Law, Labor and Antitrust, 11 INDUS. REL. L.J. 461,    
479–90, 493–518 (1989) (describing labor law as moving through three conceptual stages 
before the emergence of modern antitrust law in 1911 and the passage of the National Labor 
Relations Act in 1935). 
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“fight” our “Enem[ies,]”272 he left a critical clue as to how he could have 
placed New York’s little bakeshop regulation within the ambit of his own 
proximate faith.  As a judge, Holmes saw it as his duty to embrace a 
majority’s will with the discipline and recklessness of the ideal soldier.  
And for Holmes the ideal soldier had a name: Henry Abbott, a Union major 
he fought alongside as a young man, and someone he had “admired” and 
“loved.”273 
Compared to Holmes’s other intellectual influences,274 Abbott seems 
to come out of left field.  He wrote nothing significant during his short life, 
and there is no evidence that he had any particular interest in the world of 
ideas.  But Holmes saved Abbott a spot among his short list of heroes 
because of how he lived.  As Pulitzer Prize-winner Louis Menand 
explained in his book The Metaphysical Club, Abbott was an exceptionally 
brave Unionist despite being indifferent to the Union’s articles of faith.  
Shortly after enlisting, Menand writes, 
[Abbott] astonished himself by his own coolness under fire.  It was a talent 
he had no idea he possessed, and in every engagement afterward he seems 
to have gone out of his way to place himself in the greatest possible danger. 
  But he was contemptuous of the cause for which he fought.  He 
admired [General George B.] McClellan as a military professional and a 
Democrat, and complained continually of the political generals in the army.  
When the Emancipation Proclamation went into effect, . . . Abbott wrote 
[home] . . . to explain that “[t]he president’s proclamation is of course 
received with universal disgust.”
275
 
Despite rejecting Abbott’s attitude toward slavery,276 Holmes 
celebrated him in his moving Memorial Day speech twenty years after he 
 
 272. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther, 
supra note 245, app. at 757. 
 273. Oliver W. Holmes, Memorial Day, Address before John Sedgwick Post No. 4, 
Grand Army of the Republic, in Keene, N.H. (May 30, 1884), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, 
supra note 1, at 80, 85.  Law professor G. Edward White has identified these comments as 
pertaining to Abbott.  See WHITE, supra note 22, at 78–79. 
 274. Menand calls Abbott’s death “a touchstone in [Holmes’s mature] thought.”  
MENAND, supra note 34, at 54. 
 275. Id. at 40 (quoting Letter from Henry L. Abbott to Elizabeth Livermore (Jan. 10, 
1863), in FALLEN LEAVES: THE CIVIL WAR LETTERS OF MAJOR HENRY LIVERMORE ABBOTT 
160, 161 (Robert Garth Scott ed., 1991)). 
 276. See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Oliver W. Holmes, Sr. (Dec. 20, 1862), in 
TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 
1861–1864, at 79, 79 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1946) [hereinafter TOUCHED WITH FIRE] (“I 
never I believe have shown . . . any wavering in my belief in the right of [the Union’s] cause 
. . . .”); Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to John C. H. Wu (June 21, 1928), in BOOK NOTICES 
AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS, supra note 20, at 196, 197 (“[I]n my youth I was an 
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was killed in the Battle of the Wilderness.
277
  There, Holmes would recount 
“the awful spectacle of his advance [on] . . . the streets of 
Fredericksburg.”278  Under Virginia’s pale December sun, Holmes told his 
audience, Abbott had shown his “few surviving companions” the face of 
God: 
In less than sixty seconds he would become the focus of a hidden and 
annihilating fire from a semicircle of houses.  His first platoon had 
vanished under it in an instant, ten men falling dead by his side.  He had 
quietly turned back to where the other half of his company was 
waiting, . . . and was [soon leading a second platoon forward,] . . . in 
obedience to superior command, to certain and useless death . . . .  The end 
was distant only a few seconds; but if you had seen him with his indifferent 
carriage, and sword swinging from his finger like a cane, you never would 
have suspected that he was doing more than conducting a company drill on 
the camp parade ground.
279
 
The miracle Abbott performed was that of facing down the cruelty of 
ultimate reality with serenity and grace.  He had little choice but to depend 
on the Union for his and his family’s survival.  Born a Northerner,280 he 
took up arms for the Federals purely out of loyalty to his side.  And Holmes 
would not have it any other way.  Violence, he believed, was human 
existence at its most honest and most elemental.
281
  “[M]an’s destiny is to 
fight,” the ironical man said; “[t]herefore, take thy place on the one side or 
the other.”282  In his famous 1895 speech The Soldier’s Faith, Holmes 
summed up his conviction that war is inescapable: “I believe that the 
struggle for life is the order of the world, at which it is vain to 
 
abolitionist and shuddered at a Negro Minstrel Show, as belittling a suffering race and I am 
glad I was and did.”). 
 277. See Oliver W. Holmes, Memorial Day, Address before John Sedgwick Post No. 4, 
Grand Army of the Republic, in Keene, N.H. (May 30, 1884), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, 
supra note 1, at 80, 84 (“In the Wilderness . . . [Abbott] fell.”). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 84–85. 
 280. See Robert Garth Scott, Introduction in FALLEN LEAVES: THE CIVIL WAR LETTERS 
OF MAJOR HENRY LIVERMORE ABBOTT, supra note 275, at 1, 1–2 (discussing Abbott’s early 
life and the Abbott family’s Massachusetts roots). 
 281. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Feb. 1, 1920), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 102, 102–03 (“I do think that man at present is a 
predatory animal. . . .  I believe that force . . . is the ultima ratio, and between two groups 
that want to make inconsistent kinds of world I see no remedy except force.”). 
 282. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther, 
supra note 245, app. at 757. 
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repine. . . .  Now, at least, and perhaps as long as man dwells upon the 
globe, his destiny is battle, and he has to take the chances of war.”283 
Abbott’s display in Fredericksburg shook Holmes to his core because 
it proved he had put his duty to his homeland above all else—his life, his 
politics, and even his judgment.  Holmes thought Abbott’s assault was 
sublime, Menand points out, specifically because he “exposed 
himself . . . to danger . . . despite knowing that the order to advance was 
stupid, and despite a complete antipathy toward the cause in whose name 
he was, for all he knew, about to die.”284  For the rest of his life, Holmes 
would hold Abbott’s faith up as his north star: “I do not know the meaning 
of the universe,”285 Holmes wrote in The Soldier’s Faith, 
[b]ut in the midst of doubt, in the collapse of creeds, there is one thing I do 
not doubt, . . . and that is that the faith is true and adorable which leads a 
soldier to throw away his life in obedience to a blindly accepted duty, in a 
cause which he little understands, in a plan of campaign of which he has no 
notion, under tactics of which he does not see the use.
286
 
Under the guidance of Abbott’s example, Holmes was able to cobble a 
proximate faith together that could complete the circle on his infinite 
perspective.  To Holmes, “[t]he great forces which insured the North 
success”287 and the relative strength of “legions” held only the shallow 
significance of being the facts that directed the War’s course.288  So, too, 
were the ideologies and the opinions
289
 that made the Civil War 
 
 283. Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of Harvard 
University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 75. 
 284. MENAND, supra note 34, at 43.  Privately, both Holmes and Abbott believed the 
Fredericksburg assault was ill-advised and reckless.  See Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to 
Oliver W. Holmes, Sr. (Dec. 20, 1862), in TOUCHED WITH FIRE, supra note 276, at 79, 79 
(calling Fredericksburg “an infamous butchery in a ridiculous attempt”); Letter from Henry 
L. Abbott to Caroline L. Abbott (Dec. 21, 1862), in FALLEN LEAVES, supra note 275, at 155, 
155 (“[T]he men who ordered the crossing of the river [into Fredericksburg] are responsible 
to God for murder.”). 
 285. Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of Harvard 
University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 76. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Oliver W. Holmes, Harvard College in the War, Answer to a toast at Harvard 
University commencement (June 25, 1884), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 17, 
17. 
 288. Id. at 17–18. 
 289. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Aug. 30, 1929), in 
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 108, 108–09 (saying that “persecution [came] 
easy” for Calvinists, Catholics, abolitionists, and prohibitionists because they “kn[e]w that 
[they] kn[e]w”). 
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inevitable.
290
  A war and all the forces that feed it are merely a “horrible” 
opening into the eternal “tempestuous untamed streaming of the world.”291  
But mankind’s need for proximate meaning does not stop when the terrors 
of life are unleashed.  To embrace violence and death like Abbott had was 
to turn the reality of life’s ugliness on its head.  In the name of “roman[ce]” 
and “glory,”292 he was able to “toss life and hope like a flower before the 
feet of [his] country.”293  And that miracle is exactly where the ironical man 
picks up.  “[T]he Enemy is as good a man as thou,” Holmes had the 
ironical man tell Hand, “but kill him if thou Canst.”294 
Just as Holmes’s need for proximate meaning led him to adopt the 
ideal soldier’s belief in “my country right or wrong,”295 it also led him to 
adopt his conception of the ideal judge.
296
  The ironical man’s passion, like 
Abbott’s, was the secret of his personal redemption: regarding the mean 
and unforgiving reality of the ultimate world as a mere occasion to let his 
proximate light shine.
297
  Because in Holmes’s cosmos all events were 
purely physical, he could embrace any of them as small parts of the 
whole.
298
  With the figure of the ironical man, Holmes applied that 
willingness to embrace what exists to the cases that came to him as a judge.  
 
 290. See Oliver W. Holmes, Memorial Day, Address before John Sedgwick Post No. 4, 
Grand Army of the Republic, in Keene, N.H. (May 30, 1884), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, 
supra note 1, at 80, 80 (“[M]any of us . . . believed that the [Civil War] was inevitable.”). 
 291. Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of Harvard 
University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 80. 
 292. Oliver W. Holmes, Harvard College in the War, Answer to a toast at Harvard 
University commencement (June 25, 1884), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 17, 
18. 
 293. Id. at 19.  Holmes used these particular words to describe “men like” Robert Gould 
Shaw, a Union officer who died during the Civil War.  Id. 
 294. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to B. Learned Hand (June 24, 1918), in Gunther, 
supra note 245, app. at 757. 
 295. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Oct. 12, 1914), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 101, 101. 
 296. In The Common Law, Holmes described an ideal legal regime in similar terms: 
“The first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should correspond with the actual 
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong.”  THE COMMON LAW, 
supra note 202, at 41. 
 297. See, e.g., Oliver W. Holmes, Commencement Address at Brown University (June 
17, 1897), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 97, 99 (“It seems to me that this is 
the key to intellectual salvation . . . is to accept a like faith in one’s heart, and to be not 
merely a necessary but a willing instrument in working out the inscrutable end.”). 
 298. See, e.g., Civil War Diary of Oliver W. Holmes, quoted in TOUCHED WITH FIRE, 
supra note 276, at 23, 28 (“[W]hatever shall happen is best—for . . . good & universal (or 
general law) are synonymous terms in the universe—(I can now add that our phrase good 
only means certain general truths seen through the heart & will . . . .)”). 
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Seeing the economic and political forces that made their way to the Court 
as mere facts of his environment,
299
 Holmes could accept them as easily as 
he could accept any other corner of the universe.  He endeavored to 
“sympathize[]” with the “social structure,” he once told Laski, “as [he did] 
in many of [his] literary and philosophical judgments.”300  The truth of the 
ironical man, then, is that while he sees his country through a positivistic 
lens, he does not stop there.  He goes further by deciding to think of it as 
good and right.  He chooses to make the trajectory of his nation a part of 
who he is. 
The ironical man, in short, simply describes Holmes’s method of 
taking the cases he encountered as a judge, and doing what he could to 
emotionally connect with the realities behind them.  As he told the Suffolk 
Bar Association in 1885, a “civilized” professional “should [not only] have 
laid in the outline of the other sciences . . . he should [also] be passionate” 
about the facts he encounters.
301
  And when Holmes wrote Hand to rank the 
philosopher’s realism below the ironical man’s romanticism, he was saying 
that a purely technical understanding of his work would be meaningless 
without a proximate connection to it.  “A man of intellect,” he reminded 
Laski in a 1925 letter, “ought to . . . recogniz[e society’s] . . . unimportance 
as compared with his superlatives.”302  In a 1911 address to Harvard 
College’s class of 1861, Holmes explained how the romance of           
war—which he felt as strongly in college as he did in the           
battlefield—showed him why it is vital to add a gloss of sentimentality to 
the realities of social life: 
[W]e all of us have our notions of what is best.  I learned in the regiment 
and in the class the conclusion, at least, of what I think the best service that 
we can do for our country and for ourselves: To see so far as one may, and 
to feel, the great forces that are behind every detail—for that makes all the 
difference between philosophy and gossip, [and] between great action and 
small.
303
 
 
 299. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903) 
(Holmes, J.) (“[T]he taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.  It is a[] . . . fact 
for the moment . . . .”). 
 300. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Nov. 3, 1927), in HAROLD-LASKI 
LETTERS VOL. 2, supra note 4, at 990, 991. 
 301. Oliver W. Holmes, The Law, Remarks at a Suffolk Bar Association Dinner (Feb. 5, 
1885), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 221, 224. 
 302. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold Laski (Mar. 26, 1925), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 49, 50. 
 303. Oliver W. Holmes, The Class of ‘61, Remarks at the Fiftieth Anniversary of 
Graduation (June 28, 1911), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 94, 94. 
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When Holmes considered a case from the perspective of the ironical 
man, he did everything he could to live up to that lofty standard.  In 1902, 
mere weeks before joining the Supreme Court, he told the Chicago Bar 
Association that if a judge “aims at the highest, he must take risks.  He 
must be superior to class prejudices and to his own prejudices. . . .  He must 
throw down his naked thought . . . to take its chance for life.”304  But above 
all, Holmes told his peers, a judge who aspires to greatness “must try to 
realize the paradox that it is not necessary to be heavy in order to have 
weight.”305  Time has shown that in Lochner, Holmes hit that incredible 
mark.  Despite being personally ambivalent about maximum-hours laws,
306
 
he put everything he had behind the Bakeshop Act, as well as the 
prevailing opinions that supported it.  In an opinion that is as to-the-point 
as it is unpretentious, he managed to lift a tedious dispute over a New York 
bakeshop regulation up into something that moves us like poetry.  What 
Holmes must have known, and what generations of lawyers have always 
known, is that in Lochner his beautiful soul sang at the same pitch as New 
Yorkers’ rude politics.  On April 17, 1905, the day Holmes delivered his 
Lochner dissent, the ironical man was realized. 
CONCLUSION 
Eight years after the Court issued its Lochner decision, in a speech 
called Law and the Court, Holmes walked the Harvard Law School 
Association through his observations of the judiciary, his Americanist faith, 
and the arc of the nation.  Throughout his discussion, his palpable concern 
was the rise and expected fall of the right to liberty of contract and other 
“doctrines that had no proper place in the Constitution or the common 
law.”307  At the time he delivered his speech, Holmes had good reasons for 
 
 304. Oliver W. Holmes, Despondency and Hope, Remarks at a dinner of the Chicago 
Bar Association (Oct. 21, 1902), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 146, 148.  This 
speech is also available in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 149. 
 305. Id. 
 306. In 1907, Holmes privately told Sheehan, “I incline to believe a magazine article to 
the effect that before our clamorers for 8 hours (with which clamor I rather sympathize) 
know it, the Chinese with their endless gluttony for work, their honesty and their 
imperturbable patience will cut the white races out in the markets of the world.”  Letter from 
Oliver W. Holmes to Patrick A. Sheehan (Sept. 17, 1907), in HOLMES-SHEEHAN 
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 46, at 18, 18–19. 
 307. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law 
School Association (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 30, at 291, 
295.  This speech is also reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 145.  
Although Holmes never identified the right to contract by name, it was certainly on his 
mind.  In his speech he referred to constitutional doctrines (1) that were recognized in the 
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being mindful of the forces that brought doctrines like the right to contract 
to the fore.  During the decade and a half that followed Allgeyer, the Court 
was a restrained defender of the new right.
308
  But by the time Holmes 
addressed his audience in 1913, liberty of contract seemed to be on its way 
out.
309
  Rather than directly attacking the fading right, however, Holmes 
remained circumspect.  Understanding that his colleagues were reliably 
hostile to labor
310
 and suspicious of paternalist reformers,
311
 Holmes was 
not ready to predict its demise.  Instead, he contextualized the story of 
 
twenty years preceding 1913; (2) that were reactions to socialism; and (3) that he considered 
to be improper.  Id.  Based on these criteria, the right to contract fits the bill very nicely.  See 
supra Section II.A (discussing the rise of the right to contract); supra text accompanying 
notes 112–15 (identifying the right to contract as a reaction to socialism); supra Section II.C 
(describing Holmes’s opposition to the right to contract). 
 308. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 10 (“The first period [of the Lochner era informally 
began in 1897 with Allgeyer] and ended in about 1911, with moderate Lochnerians 
dominating the Court.”).  But see Friedman, supra note 210, at 1449 (“The period 
immediately before 1890 was one in which the Court permitted a great deal of novel 
state regulation . . . . But all that seemed to change suddenly [between 1890 and the        
mid-1920s]. . . . [W]hat may seem [today] . . . to be a small absolute number of overrulings 
looked like a sea change to observers . . . at the time.”). 
 309. See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 10 (“[F]rom approximately 1911 to 1923, . . . the 
Court, while not explicitly repudiating Lochner, generally refus[ed] to expand the       
liberty-of-contract doctrine to new scenarios, and at times seem[ed] to drastically limit the 
doctrine.”).  As law professor Jack Balkin notes, “[F]ollowing Harding’s election in 1920 
and four new appointments to the Supreme Court, the Court revived the principles of 
Lochner in 1923 in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of the District of Columbia [261 U.S. 525 
(1923)].” Balkin, supra note 13, at 684–85 (footnote omitted). The Lochner era is often 
considered to have ended for good in 1937 with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937).  See Balkin, supra note 13, at 685. 
 310. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER,            
1888–1910, at 81 (1995) (“[T]he Fuller Court [of 1888 to 1910] was reluctant to sanction 
government intervention to strengthen the legal position of industrial workers and encourage 
the formation of labor unions”); David E. Bernstein, Lochner’s Legacy’s Legacy, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 1, 39 (2003) (asserting that the Lochner-era Court consistently invalidated “laws that it 
believed had no purpose other than to aid labor unions.”); Daniel A. Farber, Who Killed 
Lochner?, 90 GEO. L.J. 985, 988 (2002) (book review) (“The Lochner-era’s philosophy may 
be best encapsulated in the Court’s recognition of a constitutional right of employers to fire 
union members. . . .  [T]he Court rejected the legitimacy of any state effort to deal with 
unequal bargaining power . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 311. See David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 VA. L. REV. 519, 
539 (1988) (“During the Lochner era, the Court [only] rarely, and grudgingly, allowed 
legislatures to make some paternalist inroads . . . at least in matters of contract.”); Aviam 
Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United States 
Supreme Court, 1888–1921, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 249, 255 (1987) (saying that from 1888 to 
1921 “[t]he Justices[] . . . devoted themselves tenaciously to rooting out paternalism 
whenever they perceived it.”); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 877 (“[T]here can be no doubt 
that most forms of redistribution and paternalism were ruled out [during the Lochner era].”). 
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doctrines like the right to contract within the ongoing ideological battle 
between those who were inclined to tradition and laissez-faire, and those 
who preferred reform and paternalism. 
To Holmes, the story of doctrines like liberty of contract began with 
the backwards-looking legal framework to which laissez-faire capitalists 
and labor and paternalist activists had to take their disputes.  “I told a labor 
leader once,” Holmes recalled in his speech, “that what they asked was 
favor, and if a decision was against them they called it wicked.  The same 
might be said of their opponents.  It means that the law is growing.”312  But, 
he continued, it would be some time before labor and capital could both 
accept the legitimacy of the laws that applied to them.  Although the law 
never fails to evolve with the problems it must resolve, 
[i]t cannot be helped . . . that the law is behind the times. . . .  [L]aw 
embodies beliefs that have triumphed in the battle of ideas and then have 
translated themselves into action, while there is still doubt, while opposite 
convictions still keep a battle front against each other, the time for law has 
not come; the notion destined to prevail is not yet entitled to the field.
313
 
In order to minimize the lag between what the law says and what most 
interested parties agree it should be, Holmes argued that “[w]e . . . need 
[an] education in the obvious—to learn to transcend our own convictions 
and to leave room for much that we hold dear to be done away with short 
of revolution by the orderly change of law.”314  But Holmes was not bullish 
on his colleagues’ capacities to rise above their economic and political 
opinions.  After thirty years on the bench, he told his audience that “[i]t is a 
misfortune [that] judge[s] read[] [their] conscious or unconscious 
sympath[ies] with one side or the other prematurely into the law.”315  It was 
a problem, he regretted to say, he did not see ending anytime soon: “Judges 
are apt to be naif, simple-minded men, and they need something of [a] 
Mephistopheles.”316 
During the two decades that saw the Court’s first recognition of the 
right to contract, and that saw its rise and eventual dip, Holmes thought the 
most significant barrier to the law’s continued evolution was his fellow 
judges’ fear of socialism.  In his 1897 speech The Path of the Law, for 
example, he argued that 
 
 312. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law 
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 
30, at 291, 294. 
 313. Id. at 294–95. 
 314. Id. at 295. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
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[w]hen socialism first began to be talked about, the comfortable classes of 
the community were a good deal frightened.  I suspect that this fear has 
influenced judicial action both here and in England . . . .  [I]n some courts 
new principles have been discovered . . . which may be generalized into 
acceptance of the economic doctrines which prevailed about fifty years 
ago, and a wholesale prohibition of what a tribunal of lawyers does not 
think about right.
317
 
Sixteen years later, when Holmes delivered his Law and the Court address, 
he had not changed his tune: “When twenty years ago a vague terror went 
over the earth and the word socialism began to be heard, I thought and still 
think that fear was translated into” illegitimate constitutional and   
common-law doctrines.
318
 
Holmes understood the gravity of his colleagues’ fears because he 
feared for the country’s future, too.  “I feel what are perhaps an old man’s 
apprehensions,”319 he revealed to the Harvard group.  Convinced that 
socialists and Progressives had used “economic superstition”320 to stoke the 
“present discontents,”321 he predicted that it would be “a slow business for 
our people to reach rational views.”322  He also worried that “competition 
from new races [and] . . . working men’s disputes” would “test whether we 
can hang together and can fight.”323  And he suspected that the country was 
“running through the world’s resources at a pace that [it] [could not] 
keep.”324  But unlike his fellow Justices, Holmes would not use his fears as 
an excuse to interfere with the country’s evolution, and he would not block 
the direction legislative majorities wanted to go with new constitutional 
doctrines like liberty of contract.  A Thayerian through and through, he 
 
 317. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, Speech at dedication of new hall of the 
Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 
30, at 167, 184.  This speech is also reproduced in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 
160. 
 318. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law 
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 
30, at 291, 295. 
 319. Id. at 296. 
 320. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Nov. 24, 1912), in THE ESSENTIAL 
HOLMES, supra note 1, at 66, 66. 
 321. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law 
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 
30, at 291, 294. 
 322. Id. at 296, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 148. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
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would instead carry out whatever instructions legislative majorities would 
send his way.
325
 
As far back as 1893, Holmes agreed with Thayer’s view that “[i]t is 
idle to rely upon Courts ‘to save a people from ruin.’”326  It was, for 
Holmes, a central reason for keeping to his hands-off theory of the judicial 
role, even as he sat atop the judicial branch.  “I have no belief in panaceas 
and almost none in sudden ruin,” Holmes told the Association members.327  
Instead, he explained, 
I believe with Montesquieu that if the chance of a battle—I may add, the 
passage of a law—has ruined a state, there was a general cause at work that 
made the state ready to perish by a single battle or a law.  Hence I am not 
much interested one way or the other in the [redistributive] nostrums now 
so strenuously urged. . . .  For most of the things that properly can be called 
evils in the present state of the law I think the main remedy, as for the evils 
of public opinion, is for us to grow more civilized.
328
 
In Lochner, because Holmes did not think judges could save their 
societies, he did not share Peckham’s objection to leaving the country “at 
the mercy of legislative majorities.”329  “Every opinion,” he argued in his 
dissent, “tends to become a law.”330  The country had risen thanks to the 
“displays of intellect, force of character, and power of divination”331 of 
nameless multitudes, and its destiny belonged to the same.  “Everything 
tells in its due proportion, in the organic processes of social growth,”332 
Holmes told a Boston University crowd in 1890.  “Nature knows no such 
thing as a force not counting for its full number of foot-pounds.”333 
 
 325. In 1912, only a few months before his Law and the Court speech, Holmes recalled 
telling sitting president William Howard Taft that “if they could make a case for putting 
Rockefeller in prison I should do my part; but if they left it to me I should put up a bronze 
statue of him.”  Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Lewis Einstein (Oct. 28, 1912), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 141, 141. 
 326. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to James B. Thayer (Nov. 2, 1893), in Luban, supra 
note 192, at 462 n.34 (quoting Thayer, supra note 176, at 156). 
 327. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law 
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 
30, at 291, 295. 
 328. Id. at 295–96. 
 329. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905) (Peckham, J.). 
 330. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 331. Oliver W. Holmes, Anonymity and Achievement, Remarks at a dinner of the 
Alumni of the Boston University Law School (June 3, 1890), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, 
supra note 31, at 59, 59. 
 332. Id. at 61. 
 333. Id. 
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Fearing for the country’s future, and unwilling to interfere with the 
Republic’s course, Holmes would not tie his ironclad patriotism334 to the 
fate of his nation or even to his culture.  “There are half a dozen 
futures . . . for our civilization,” Holmes once told the Irish historian Alice 
Stopford Green, “that seem to me equally probable and among them is the 
possibility of [one] cutting its own throat or of one going down hill in some 
way.”335  Instead, as he wound down his Law and the Court address, he 
offered his audience a hopeful philosophical picture of what the country 
could become: 
I do not pin my dreams for the future to my country or even to my race.  I 
think it probable that civilization somehow will last as long as I care to look 
ahead . . . .  I think it not improbable that man, like the grub that prepares a 
chamber for the winged thing it never has seen but is to be—that man may 
have cosmic destinies that he does not understand.
336
 
But Holmes would not stop there.  As he closed out his thoughts on 
the evolution of the country he loved, he offered some spiritual 
encouragement to his audience as well.  The warrior country that “touched 
[him] with fire” as a young man,337 he acknowledged years earlier in The 
Soldier’s Faith, had been eclipsed by the interests of commerce.338  Among 
every stratum of society “money [had become] the main thing.”339  “There 
are many, poor and rich,” he said with a soft sadness, “who think that love 
of country is an old wife’s tale, to be replaced by interest in a labor union, 
or . . . by a rootless self-seeking search for a place where the most 
enjoyment may be had at the least cost.”340  But no matter what would 
 
 334. See, e.g., Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 27, 1917), in 
HOLMES & FRANKFURTER, supra note 225, at 69, 70 (“Patriotism is the demand of the 
territorial club for priority. . . .  I go the whole hog for the territorial club and I don’t care a 
damn if it interferes with some of the spontaneities of the other groups.”). 
 335. Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Alice Stopford Green (Oct. 1, 1901), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 111, 111. 
 336. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law 
School Association of New York (Feb. 15, 1913), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 
30, at 291, 296. 
 337. Oliver W. Holmes, Memorial Day, Address before John Sedgwick Post No. 4, 
Grand Army of the Republic, in Keene, N.H. (May 30, 1884), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES, 
supra note 1, at 80, 86 (“[T]he generation that carried on the war has been set apart by its 
experience.  Through our great good fortune, in our youth our hearts were touched with 
fire.”). 
 338. Oliver W. Holmes, The Soldier’s Faith, Address to the graduating class of Harvard 
University (May 30, 1895), in OCCASIONAL SPEECHES, supra note 31, at 73, 73 (“[W]ar is 
out of fashion . . . .  The aspirations of the world are those of commerce.”). 
 339. Id. at 74. 
 340. Id. 
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become of the Empire, Holmes counseled the Harvard group to take solace 
in something that is far more valuable and far more enduring—the eternal 
flame that burns in the hearts of mankind: 
  The other day my dream was pictured to my mind.  It was evening.  I 
was walking homeward on Pennsylvania Avenue near the Treasury, and as 
I looked beyond Sherman’s Statue to the west the sky was aflame with 
scarlet and crimson from the setting sun.  But, like the note of downfall in 
Wagner’s opera, below the sky line there came from little globes the pallid 
discord of the electric lights.  And I thought to myself the 
Götterdämmerung will end, and from those globes clustered like evil eggs 
will come the new masters of the sky.  It is like the time in which we live.  
But then I remembered the faith that I partly have expressed, faith in a 
universe not measured by our fears, a universe that has thought and more 
than thought inside of it, and as I gazed, after the sunset and above the 
electric lights there shone the stars.
341
 
 
 341. Oliver W. Holmes, Law and the Court, Speech at a Dinner of the Harvard Law 
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